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When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can
bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low,
firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the
cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is mod-
eled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of
scale. We show that class actions, and the firms’ incentive to block them, may
or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting,
treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat
play are also considered.
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1 Introduction
In the United States, victims of corporate misconduct and unlawful business prac-
tices can sometimes consolidate their individual lawsuits into a single class action,
so as to achieve economies of scale and other benefits.1 Examples of successful class
action litigation include products liability lawsuits, pricing fixing and other antitrust
lawsuits, lawsuits by employees against an employer alleging discrimination, and secu-
rities class actions by public investors. Traditionally, the U.S. legal system was quite
hospitable to class actions. In 1980, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court extolled the
class-action mechanism, stating that “aggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”2 With the endorsement of
the U.S. Supreme Court, class actions flourished in the United States.
Recently, however, the class-action mechanism has been under attack. Most im-
portantly, the U.S. Supreme Court tightened the requirements for class certification
through cases, such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, significantly raising the barriers against new class actions.3 Furthermore,
businesses increasingly deflect class actions by requiring consumers, suppliers, and
employees to waive their rights to bring class actions. When purchasing a cell phone
plan, for example, consumers are required to sign away their right to litigate and agree
to channel their complaints through individual arbitration.4 In a series of landmark
rulings, including Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld private contracts that block class actions.5
This paper analyzes the private and social desirability of class action lawsuits
1See for example Dam (1975), Miller (1998), Bone (2012), and Rosenberg and Spier (2014).
Notwithstanding the possible benefits, the class action has always been controversial. Many scholars
and practitioners have argued that the system is inefficient and engenders a new type of agency
problem, that between plaintiffs and their representative lawyers.
2See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in its modern form, was adopted in 1966 and allows lawsuits to be brought on
behalf of a class of victims who have allegedly suffered harm.
3See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569
U.S. 27 (2013).
4These contractual arrangements have proliferated recently. See Gilles (2005), Resnik (2015),
and Choi and Spier (2021). A recent federal bill, The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of
2017 (FICLA), is also viewed as being hostile to class actions.
5See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued the Arbitration Agreements
Rule prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts but the rule was
overturned by Congress in a 51-50 vote. See Ackerman and Hayashi (2017). There is also debate
about whether a firm undertaking IPOs may impose a mandatory arbitration clause in its charter
or bylaws. See Aggarwal, Choi, and Eldar (2020).
1
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in the context of private antitrust litigation.6 We focus on possible price fixing by
firm-defendants in a market, and the class action is modeled as a mechanism that
allows consumer-plaintiffs and their attorneys to lower their cost of bringing lawsuits
against the firm-defendants. Our analysis produces several results. Importantly, the
analysis shows that class action lawsuits may or may not be socially desirable. In
some circumstances, the threat of class actions may force the firms to lower their
prices to avoid lawsuits. But if the class action mechanism makes lawsuits sufficiently
cheap and easy to bring, firms may simply accept litigation as a necessary cost of
business and engage in even more egregious anti-competitive conduct. We show that,
depending on the circumstances, the firms’ private incentive to block class action
lawsuits may be socially excessive or socially insufficient.
We begin with a simple model where firm-defendants collude to fix their prices in
the shadow of future litigation. A higher price-cost markup raises the level of damages
that the consumers can collect, in case the firms are found guilty of price fixing. We
parameterize the degree to which consumers are forward-looking and anticipate being
plaintiffs in future antitrust litigation. Fully forward-looking consumers have rational
expectations and understand that they may receive damage payments from the firms
in the future. These sophisticated consumers view the expected damage payments
as a rebate that partially offsets the purchase price of the product. Fully myopic
consumers, on the other hand, do not foresee being plaintiffs in the future, and focus
only on the sticker price when deciding whether or not to purchase the product.
The most profitable strategy for the colluding firms depends on the consumers’
cost of bringing private antitrust lawsuits and on the degree of consumer myopia. We
analyze the firms’ pricing strategies for three different regions of litigation costs: a
high-cost region where the firms engage in unbridled collusion and lawsuits never arise,
an intermediate-cost region where the threat of litigation disciplines the market price,
and a low-cost region where firms collude and endure lawsuits in equilibrium. For
each region we perform local comparative statics to see how lowering the consumer-
plaintiffs’ costs of bringing lawsuits and the degree of consumer myopia affect prices,
profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also examine the (potentially dis-
continuous) changes in welfare when costs move across regions.
First, when the consumers’ cost of bringing lawsuits is above a threshold, the firms
are effectively immune from litigation. Since consumers face high barriers to bringing
lawsuits against the firms, the firms will collude and fix their prices at unconstrained
6Between 1975 and 2012, 92% of all antitrust lawsuits filed in U.S. District courts were brought
by private parties rather than by government agencies. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Online, www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost5.html. See also Crane (2011). Private antitrust litigation
may be a substitute or a complement for public enforcement. Kauper and Snyder (1985) find in
their sample of 1,938 private antitrust cases that 91% were initiated independently of government
cases and 9% were follow-on cases.
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monopoly levels. From the firms’ perspective, this is the ideal outcome. From the
perspective of consumers and the social planner, this is suboptimal. Consumers must
pay a high price for the products, and the market suffers the conventional deadweight
loss from restricted supply. Given that there is no litigation in equilibrium, though,
there is no deadweight loss from litigation.
Second, when the consumers’ cost of bringing suit is in an intermediate region,
the firms will deter lawsuits by setting the price below the monopoly level. Had
the firms charged the unconstrained monopoly price, the consumers would have filed
antitrust lawsuits, and resources would be spent on litigation. In this intermediate
case, the firms lower the market price to just below the point where the consumers
are indifferent between bringing suit and not bringing suit. Note that when the
consumers’ cost of bringing suit falls, the market price must fall too. The lower
market price harms the firms’ profits, but increases consumer surplus and benefits
society more broadly (the deadweight loss shrinks).
Third, when the consumers’ cost of bringing private antitrust lawsuits is in a low
region, the colluding firms will choose to accommodate lawsuits. Instead of deterring
lawsuits by charging a very low price, the colluding firms will instead raise their prices
to (modified) monopoly levels. Here, the colluding firms make a conscious decision
to accept the costs of litigation as simply another cost of doing business. In this low
region, the firms and the consumers are better off when, on the margin, it is cheaper
for consumers to bring private antitrust lawsuits. Lower costs correspond to lower
prices for the consumers and higher profits for the firms. We show that firms are
better off when consumers are forward looking, but consumers may be worse off. If
consumers are myopic and do not foresee being plaintiffs in future litigation, the firms
may set lower prices to stimulate demand.
Next, we adapt the benchmark model to explore the implications of class action
lawsuits. We focus on two salient effects. First, class actions allow the consumer-
plaintiffs to achieve economies of scale and lower the costs of litigation. Second, class
actions create a separation of ownership and control of the litigation, and may allow
the lawyers and other third parties to capture the value from litigation. We explore the
firms’ private incentives to block class action lawsuits by requiring consumer to sign
class action waivers as a condition of purchase, and the social welfare implications.
Our analysis shows that the firms’ private incentives to block class action lawsuits
may be either aligned with the social incentives, socially excessive, or socially insuf-
ficient. The fact that the firms may have a socially excessive incentive to block class
actions is not surprising. Imagine that when class actions are blocked, the firms are
effectively immune from litigation (because the cost of bringing an individual lawsuit
is very high). Then, the firms can engage in unbridled collusion. If class actions allow
the consumer-plaintiffs and their attorneys to achieve economies of scale, and (im-
portantly) if the cost of bringing a class action lawsuit is in the intermediate region,
3
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class actions have a valuable deterrent effect. The threat of class action litigation
forces the firms to lower their prices, and consumer surplus and social welfare rise.
In other settings, the firms’ private decision to block class actions is socially desir-
able. Suppose, as above, that, when class actions are blocked, the firms are effectively
immune from litigation. Suppose further that the economies of scale from class ac-
tions are very strong, so the cost of bringing a class action lawsuit is in the low region.
In such a scenario, class actions do not deter the firms from colluding on price.7 In-
stead, the firms will raise their prices above the standard monopoly level to account
for the costs of litigation, creating a larger deadweight loss. The deadweight loss may
be larger if lawyers and third parties capture the litigation surplus. For these reasons,
the consumers are better off blocking class actions, too.8
Finally, there are settings where firms allow class actions but consumers and so-
ciety would be better off if class actions were blocked. To illustrate how this can
happen, suppose that the cost of bringing an individual lawsuit is in the intermediate
region. Then, the threat of individual litigation has a deterrent effect and the firms
reduce their prices to avoid litigation. Suppose further that the cost of bringing a
class action is in the low region. Class actions do not deter collusion in this case.
The firms will embrace litigation and set their prices at even higher level, reducing
consumer surplus and increasing the deadweight loss. When the scale economies are
very strong, the firms’ incentive to allow class actions may be socially excessive or,
equivalently, their incentives to block class actions socially insufficient.
We also extend the basic analysis in several directions. First, our main analysis
assumes that all lawsuits go to trial. We show that in a world of frictionless settlement,
whether the firms will allow credible lawsuits in equilibrium depends on the degree of
consumers’ myopia. If the consumers are fully forward-looking, for instance, the firms
can obtain the unconstrained monopoly profit regardless of the consumers’ litigation
cost. If the consumers are (partially) myopic, on the other hand, the firms may choose
a price below the full-monopoly level to deter lawsuits and keep settlement off the
equilibrium path. Other variations, such as fee-shifting rules, damage multipliers,
interactions with public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play,
are also examined.
Our model is related to the literature on the real effects of treble damages in private
antitrust litigation. Breit and Elzinga (1974) and Easterbrook (1985) have argued
that far-sighted consumers will take into account future damage awards when making
their purchase decisions.9 In models with costless litigation, Salant (1987) and Baker
7To deter lawsuits, the firms would need to lower their prices dramatically.
8Interestingly, it is not socially desirable for the cost of litigation to be too small. We prove
that social welfare is highest when the consumer’s cost of bringing suit is at the very bottom of the
intermediate-cost region.
9Easterbrook (1985, 451) notes that if consumers “have perfect information and enforcement is
4
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(1988) show formally how damage remedies (even treble damages) can have neutral
welfare consequences and no deterrent effect. Besanko and Spulber (1990) show that
this neutrality does not hold when the firms have private information about the cost
of production and expected damages are under-compensatory (an assumption that
we will relax). None of these papers fully characterize the equilibrium pricing and
settlement strategies with costly litigation, explore the comparative statics, or derive
the welfare implications with respect to class actions and class action waivers.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup of the model,
characterizes the equilibrium, and presents basic comparative statics results. Section
3 explores the positive and normative implications of class actions, paying particular
attention to the economies scale in litigation and rent extraction by lawyers and third
parties. Section 4 extends the basic model to include out-of-court settlement, the
shifting of legal fees to the loser, damage multipliers, public enforcement, and repeat
play. Proofs may be found in Appendix A.
2 The Model
Suppose there is a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer demands at most one unit
of the good and has valuation v ∈ [0, v]. The valuations are distributed according to a
strictly positive and differentiable probability density function f(·) and corresponding
cumulative density function F (·). Conditional on equilibrium price p, the aggregate





There are N > 1 firms in the market with the identical, constant marginal cost of
c ∈ [0, v). Both the number of firms (N) and the constant marginal cost (c) are
common knowledge. Firms sell homogeneous products. Consumers costlessly observe
all posted prices and other non-price terms (such as a class action waiver) in the
market before deciding whether (and from whom) to purchase.
We now define some important notation. If the equilibrium market price is p then




(p− c)f(v)dv = D(p)(p− c). (1)
costless, they view the future recovery as a cents-off coupon attached to each purchase.”
10Spulber (1989, 592) briefly discusses litigation costs and how firms may choose to either allow
or prevent litigation.
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Without any collusion, we assume that the firms compete head-to-head, charge p = c,
and earn zero profits.11 With perfect collusion (and with no liability), on the other
hand, the firms would agree to set the price at the monopoly level:
pm(c) = arg max Π(p, c). (2)
For ease of analysis, we assume that the profit function is strictly concave in price
and therefore pm(c) is unique. Finally, social welfare is
W (p, c) =
∫ v
p
(v − c)f(v)dv. (3)
From the social welfare function, the first-best outcome is obtained (i.e., social welfare
is maximized) when p = c.
Suppose that there are antitrust laws that allow consumers to bring lawsuits when
the market price is above marginal cost, p > c.12 Consumers who have purchased the
product can then sue the firms to collect damages d = θ(p−c) where θ ∈ (0, 1). There
are different interpretations of the parameter θ. It could simply be the probability
that the plaintiffs will successfully present evidence of collusion. Alternatively, θ < 1
could reflect court error or a pro-defendant bias where the court gives a “haircut” of
1 − θ to the actual overcharge. By tweaking notation, it could also reflect a biased
assessment by the court of the firm-defendants’ marginal costs. Note that since θ < 1,
the expected damage award is not fully compensatory. We will see shortly that the
assumption also implies that the firms are not completely deterred from colluding on
price.13
Litigation is expensive for both the consumers and the firms. The litigation costs
per unit sold are kp > 0 for the consumers (the plaintiffs) and kd > 0 for the firms
(the defendants). We let k = kp + kd and assume that c + k < v.
14 Given the
positive litigation cost, consumers will bring suit if and only if it is profitable to do
11This is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the static pricing game. If N > 2, there are
payoff-equivalent non-symmetric equilibria of the static game where, for example, some firms charge
p > c and have zero sales. The allocation of consumers is irrelevant in this environment.
12For now, we restrict attention to private antitrust litigation. It is estimated that there are ten
private antitrust lawsuits for every one government suit. See Crane (2011). Lande and Davis (2007)
find in a sample of large antitrust actions that $18 billion were paid in private damages and $4
billion in criminal penalties. The gap remains significant even when prison sentences are taken into
account. In Section 4.4, we examine how also allowing public enforcement affects the main results.
13In Section 3.2, we analyze the possibility that third parties (for instance, class action lawyers or
frivolous plaintiffs) capture surplus from litigation. Section 4.3 extends the analysis to allow θ ≥ 1,
e.g. through supra-compensatory damages.
14This condition implies that the product would be sold even if all consumers bring lawsuits. We
assume that kp and kd reflect real economic costs rather than attorney rents. Attorney rent-seeking
is explored in Section 3.2.
6
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so: θ(p− c)− kp > 0. When indifferent, θ(p− c)− kp = 0, we assume that consumers
do not bring suit.15
We let µ ∈ [0, 1] parameterize the degree to which consumers anticipate being
plaintiffs in litigation. When µ = 0, the consumers are myopic and do not expect to
benefit from litigation in the future. In this case, any litigation surplus will accrue to
the consumers’ future selves. When µ = 1, the consumers are fully forward-looking:
they apply higher-level reasoning and can foresee being plaintiffs in ex post litigation.
When µ = 1, consumers will treat any future damage award, minus the litigation
cost, as an expected rebate when making their purchase decisions.16 In general, a
consumer will purchase the product if their valuation for the product exceeds the
perceived net price, v ≥ p− µ×max{θ(p− c)− kp, 0}. In contrast to the consumers,
we assume that the firms have rational expectations about future litigation.
The timing of the game is as follows. At t = 1, the N firms offer to sell homoge-
neous products at price, p, and with or without a class action waiver. We implicitly
assume that the firms are acting in their joint interest, and have mechanisms to en-
force their collusive agreement.17 At t = 2, the consumers decide whether to purchase
the product. After purchasing the product, at t = 3, consumers decide whether to
bring suit to collect damages for any overcharges. If lawsuits are brought, the per-
unit litigation costs are borne and per-unit damages d = θ(p − c) are paid at t = 4.
For simplicity, there is no time discounting. The solution concept is subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Preliminary Analysis
We begin by characterizing the firm’s profit function. If p ≤ c + kp/θ, lawsuits have
(weakly) negative expected value and the consumers do not bring suits ex post. A
consumer will purchase the product if v > p, and the firms’ aggregate profits are
Π(p, c) = D(p)(p− c). If p > c+ kp/θ, lawsuits have positive expected value and the
consumers will bring suits ex post, obtaining a net rebate of θ(p − c) − kp per unit.
A consumer will purchase the product when their valuation v (weakly) exceeds the
perceived effective price x(p), where
x(p) = p− µ(θ(p− c)− kp). (4)
15Note that while each consumer places a different valuation on the product, each consumer’s
cost of litigation is the same. This assumption is made for simplicity.
16Alternatively, one can interpret µ as the consumer-plaintiff’s discount factor, or the probability
with which consumers expect to receive a rebate.
17They could accomplish this through repeated interaction if price deviations are observed and
the discount factor is sufficiently high. See the repeat play extension in Section 4.5.
7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329316
8
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 180 [2020]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/180
If p > c+ kp/θ, the aggregate demand is D(x(p)) and, taking into account the firms’
litigation costs and damage payments, aggregate firm profits are
D(x(p))[p− c− (θ(p− c) + kd)]. (5)
Rearranging this expression, and recalling that k = kp + kd, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Aggregate firm profits are a piecewise continuous function of the price p:
Π(p, c) if p ≤ c+ kp/θ
Π(x(p), c+ k)− (1− µ)D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp] if p > c+ kp/θ
(6)
where x(p) is defined in (4). Conditional on p, aggregate firm profits are weakly
increasing in µ.
The profit function in equation (6) is intuitive. Suppose p > c + kp/θ. If the
consumers are completely forward-looking (µ = 1), the firms’ aggregate profits are
simply Π(x(p), c+k), the profits of a hypothetical firm with unit cost c+k. This makes
sense. When µ = 1, then effective price paid by consumers is x(p) = p−(θ(p−c)−kp)
and the effective price received by the firms is p− θ(p− c)− kd. Using the litigation
system to transfer θ(p−c) from the firms to the consumers is inefficient, as the parties
jointly bear the cost of litigation k = kp+kd. So, the first term in the firm’s aggregate
profit function in (6), Π(x(p), c+ k), reflects both the production cost c and the joint
litigation cost k.
The second term in equation (6), (1−µ)D(x(p))[θ(p− c)−kp], is intuitive as well.
This is the loss of firm profits stemming from the misperceptions of consumers. To
understand why, recall that θ(p−c)−kp is the consumers’ net ex post rebate per unit
sold. Consumers anticipate receiving fraction µ of this rebate at the time of purchase,
but fraction 1 − µ is unanticipated. So, (1 − µ)D(x(p))[θ(p − c) − kp] is an ex post
windfall for the consumers. Thus, the second term from equation (6) quantifies the
transfer of value from the firms to the myopic consumers.
Note that the firms’ aggregate profits in equation (6) is a discontinuous function of
the price, p. If the price is below the threshold, p ≤ c+ kp/θ, consumers do not bring
lawsuits and the profit function reflects the production costs only, Π(p, c). When the
effective price is above the threshold, p > c + kp/θ, the consumers bring lawsuits
ex post and the firms’ profits drop. This happens for two distinct reasons. First,
the profits fall because consumers bring lawsuits and litigation is costly. Second,
when consumers are myopic and do not anticipate being plaintiffs in litigation, the
consumers receive a windfall gain ex post so, as previously discussed, the firms suffer
a corresponding loss.
8
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(θ(x− c)− kp). (7)
Define k̂p be the implicit solution to the following equation:
Π (c+ kp/θ, c) = max
x
{Π(x, c+ kp + kd)− (1− µ)D(x)[θ(p(x)− c)− kp]} . (8)
The left-hand side of (8) represents the firms’ aggregate profits when p = c+kp/θ. No
lawsuits are filed and consumers purchase the product if and only if v ≥ p = c+kp/θ.
The right-hand side of (8) represents the maximal profits for the firms when they
charge an effective price x (as perceived by consumers) and the consumers bring
lawsuits. The following lemma states that k̂p exists and is unique, and describes how
k̂p depends on the parameter µ.
Lemma 2. There exists a unique value k̂p(µ) ∈ (0, θ(pm(c) − c)) that satisfies (8).
As µ increases, k̂p increases: k̂
′
p(µ) > 0.
The definition of k̂p(µ) in (8) is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 for the special
case where consumers are fully forward-looking (µ = 1). The effective price x is on the
horizontal axis. The upper parabola represents the firms’ aggregate profits when there
is no litigation, while the lower parabola represents the aggregate profits when there
is litigation. As kp rises, the upper parabola remains fixed and the lower parabola
shifts downwards. When kp = k̂p, the aggregate profits the firm can generate while
bypassing litigation are the same as the maximum profits they can earn while allowing
litigation (the peak of the lower parabola). More generally, if µ < 1, then the lower
parabola in Figure 1 would shift downwards, representing the loss of profits from
systematic consumer misperceptions about future litigation. The upper parabola,
representing firm profits without litigation, would remain fixed. Thus, as indicated
in Lemma 2, the threshold k̂p(µ) is smaller when consumers are myopic (µ < 1) and
do not fully anticipate being plaintiffs in future litigation.
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
The threshold plaintiff litigation cost k̂p(µ) defined in Lemma 2 plays an important
role in our analysis of the firms’ pricing strategy. When kp < k̂p(µ), because the
consumers’ litigation cost is sufficiently low, the firms are better off allowing lawsuits
in equilibrium. The firms will raise the effective price above the monopoly price pm(c)
and the consumers will bring suit after purchasing the product. When kp rises and
9
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Figure 1: Definition of k̂p (µ = 1)
crosses the threshold k̂p(µ) from below, firms will lower the price to p = c + kp/θ to
deter lawsuits in equilibrium. When kp rises above θ(p
m(c)− c), the firms can charge
the unconstrained monopoly price and enjoy immunity from litigation, as consumers
would find it prohibitively expensive to pursue antitrust litigation. Proposition 1
describes the firms’ pricing strategies, profits, and social welfare.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium prices, litigation decisions, firm profits, and social
welfare depend on the plaintiffs’ litigation costs kp and parameter µ as follows:
1. If kp < k̂p(µ), the effective price is p












k̃), c + k̃) and social welfare is W (pm(c + k̃), c + k). When µ ∈ (0, 1], as kp
increases, firm profits and social welfare strictly decrease. When µ = 0, as
kp increases, firm profits stay the same and social welfare strictly decreases.










, the price is c + kp
θ
and no lawsuits are brought













. As kp increases, firm profits increase and social welfare decreases.
Neither firm profits nor social welfare depend on µ.
18At the time of purchase, the consumer pays an actual price that is higher than pm(c + k̃) but
receives a rebate ex post.
10
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3. If kp ≥ θ(pm(c)−c), the price is pm(c) and no lawsuits are brought in equilibrium.
Aggregate firm profits are Π(pm(c), c) and social welfare is W (pm(c), c). Neither
firm profits nor social welfare depend on kp or µ.
According to Proposition 1, when the consumers’ litigation cost is below the
threshold, kp < k̂p(µ), the colluding firms treat the future litigation costs and dam-
age payments as just another cost of doing business, and set price accordingly. The





kd > 0. The expression k̃ can
be thought of as the firms’ total (direct and indirect) litigation cost born in equilib-
rium. In addition to the direct litigation cost of kd, firms will also indirectly bear
consumers’ litigation cost of kp, depending on how forward looking consumers are.
For instance, when µ = 1, then k̃ = kp + kd and the effective price paid by consumers
is pm(c+kp+kd). With fully forward looking consumers, because the consumers take
into account the litigation cost to the fullest extent and lower their willingness to pay
in accordance, the firms get to fully (and indirectly) bear the consumers’ litigation
cost. When µ = 0, on the other hand, consumers treat the price at face value and so
k̃ = kd
1−θ and p
m(c+ k̃) do not depend on the consumer’s litigation cost kp.
19
When the consumers’ litigation cost is in the middle range, kp ∈ [k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c)−
c)), the firms find it worthwhile to set the price just low enough to deter lawsuits:
p = c + kp/θ. Finally, when the consumer-plaintiffs’ litigation cost is in the high
region, kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c), the firms simply collude on the monopoly price of pm(c)
and consumers will not sue since lawsuits are prohibitively expensive. The colluding
firms are insulated from litigation in this case. The results from Proposition 1 are
shown in Figure 2 for the special case where consumers are fully forward looking and
expect to receive the full litigation surplus (µ = 1) and in Figure 3 for the case where
consumers are completely myopic (µ = 0).
2.3 Comparative Statics
Proposition 1 describes how aggregate firm profits and social welfare depend on the
plaintiff’s litigation cost, kp, and the consumer (mis)perceptions parameter µ. In this
subsection, we discuss these comparative statics results in more detail. In the first
part, we examine how firm profits and social welfare change as kp changes and, in the
second, we examine the impact of change in µ.
2.3.1 Litigation Costs
When kp < k̂p(µ), in equilibrium, consumers file suit after purchasing the product. As
illustrated in Figure 2 for the special case where consumers are fully forward looking
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Figure 2: Firm Profits and Social Welfare (µ = 1)
(µ = 1), the firms’ profits are falling as kp rises in this region, just as they would
if the firms’ own production costs were to increase. This is a more general result.
According to part 1 of Proposition 1, firm profits are decreasing function of kp for all
µ ∈ (0, 1]. When consumers are completely myopic (µ = 0), neither the effective price
nor firm profits depend on kp (see Figure 3). Since consumers do not expect to be
recipients of the net damage awards, the firms cannot capture the cost savings either.
When kp < k̂p(µ), social welfare is a strictly decreasing function of kp for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
Increasing the plaintiff’s litigation costs harms social welfare directly—since litigation
is even more wasteful—and indirectly through an increase in the effective price and
the associated reduction in demand.20





. The firms lower
their prices to c + kp/θ in order to avoid costly litigation. Consumers do not bring
lawsuits after purchasing the product. This helps consumers and also increases social
welfare, as shown by the discontinuity of the social welfare function in Figures 2 and
3. The increase in social welfare comes from two sources: (1) more consumers pur-
chase the product because the (effective) price is lower; and (2) there is less wasteful
litigation spending. When kp rises within this middle region, firms are better off
(since they can raise their prices closer to pm(c) and still avoid lawsuits) but social
20Note also that even as kp goes to zero, both the social welfare and the firm profits stay below
those under the unconstrained monopoly price (pm(c)). The reason is that even when kp = 0, firms
still face a positive litigation cost (kd > 0), which generates a welfare loss from litigation and also
imposes a higher marginal cost on the firms (c+ kd), thereby reducing the aggregate demand.
12
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Figure 3: Firm Profits and Social Welfare (µ = 0)
welfare falls (as the higher prices harm consumers and create a larger dead-weight
loss). Finally, when the consumer-plaintiff’s litigation costs are in the highest region,
kp > θ(p
m(c)− c), then the firms charge the unconstrained monopoly price pm(c) and
avoid litigation. Increasing kp has no affect on profits or social welfare in this region.
The next corollary follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Conditional on µ, firm profits are maximized when plaintiff litigation
costs are sufficiently high, kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c). Social welfare is maximized when
kp = k̂p(µ) > 0.
Corollary 1 tells us that the firms want the plaintiffs’ litigation costs to be in the
highest range. This makes intuitive sense. Firms would obviously like to squelch
all future litigation and charge the unrestricted monopoly price of pm(c). This is
possible only when the costs of litigation are prohibitively high, kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c)).
More interestingly, Corollary 1 tells us that it is not in society’s interest for the
plaintiff’s litigation costs to be too small. According to Proposition 1, if kp = 0,
the effective price charged by the firms would be strictly greater than pm(c) and
social welfare would be less than W (pm(c), c).21 If plaintiffs could costlessly bring
litigation against the firms for overcharges, the firms would not simply cease their
anticompetitive conduct and lower their prices. Instead, they will accept litigation as
21Even if the firms’ litigation cost were zero (kd = 0), firms will still charge p
m(c) and earn
Π(pm(c), c). As kd −→ 0, social welfare will converge to W (pm(c), c). With costless litigation (kp =
kd = 0), we get the invariance result.
13
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another cost of doing business and will raise their prices. Social welfare obtains its
maximum value when kp = k̂p(µ) > 0.
2.3.2 Consumer (Mis)perceptions
According to Proposition 1, when kp < k̂p(µ), firm profits are strictly increasing in
the parameter µ. In other words, firms are better off when consumers are forward
looking rather than myopic. Intuitively, holding the price fixed, the firm will sell
more of the product when consumers have rational expectations about the damage
awards or “rebates” that they will receive through litigation in the future. Comparing
Figure 2 with Figure 3 illustrates this result: profits higher in the low range when
µ = 1 than µ = 0. We also see in Figures 2 and 3 that k̂p(1) > k̂p(0): there is
more equilibrium litigation when consumers are forward looking than when they are
myopic. More generally, raising µ has the effect of expanding the range of parameter
values for which the firms will tolerate litigation in equilibrium (Lemma 2).
Interestingly, changes in the parameter µ have an ambiguous effect on social wel-
fare. To see why, suppose, first, that kp = 0. Comparing Figures 2 and Figure 3,
we can see social welfare is strictly higher when consumers are fully forward looking.
Myopic consumers do not anticipate receiving any litigation surplus and therefore
take the market price at face value and purchase less, creating a larger deadweight




. Comparing Figures 2 and 3 we see
that social welfare is strictly higher when consumers are myopic. When consumers
are myopic the firms charge p = c + kp/θ and deter all litigation. When consumers
are forward looking, the firms raise the price and allow litigation, creating a larger
deadweight loss and lowering social welfare. The next corollary, which follows directly
from Proposition 1, generalizes these findings.
Corollary 2. Let k̂p(0) < k̂p(1) be the thresholds defined in Lemma 2 when µ = 0
and µ = 1, respectively.
1. If kp < k̂p(0) then firm profits are maximized when µ = 1. Social welfare is




2. If kp ∈ [k̂p(0), k̂p(1)] then firm profits are maximized when µ = 1 and social
welfare is maximized when µ = 0.
3. If kp > k̂p(1) then neither firm profits nor social welfare depend on µ.
As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, when the litigation costs kp are sufficiently small,
both firm profits and social welfare are highest when consumers are forward looking
and expect to capture the full litigation surplus (µ = 1). So, when litigation costs are
14
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sufficiently small, private and social incentives are aligned. When the litigation costs
rise, however, the private and social interests diverge. Firm profits are highest when
consumers are fully forward looking (µ = 1) and expect to be plaintiffs in litigation;
social welfare is highest if consumers are myopic (µ = 0).
3 Class Actions
In the United States, individual price-fixing lawsuits are often joined or consolidated
into larger claims. Some of these consolidated actions are organized by the plaintiffs
themselves.22 With voluntary joinders and direct actions, the plaintiffs hire outside
lawyers and privately negotiate attorney fee arrangements.23 Other consolidated ac-
tions are initiated by self-appointed lawyers. In a typical class action with small
dispersed plaintiffs, lawyers recruit a small number of “lead plaintiffs” and bring suit
on behalf of the absent class members. The class-action attorney has significant con-
trol over the litigation and decides how much time and money to spend pursuing
the case. At the conclusion of litigation, the attorney is reimbursed for their out-of-
pocket expenses (court fees, travel expenses, expert witness fees, etc.) and the court
determines the attorney fee.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the class-action
attorney’s fee be “reasonable.” The courts have considerable discretion in setting
attorney fees in class action litigation. The two common approaches that courts
use to set attorney fees are the lodestar method and percentage method. With the
lodestar method, the court determines a reasonable number of hours to be spent on
the case, multiplies that number by a reasonable hourly rate for the lawyer’s time,
and then makes adjustments for various factors. With a pure percentage method, the
court awards the lawyers a percentage of the recovery without considering the number
of hours that the lawyers spent on the case. In practice, judges often determine fees
using a combination of methods.24
We will now adapt the benchmark model from Section 2 to explore the positive
and normative implications of class actions in private antitrust litigation. First, class
actions allow the consumer-plaintiffs to achieve economies of scale, thus lowering the
22For example, in the Spring of 2019, supermarket chain Kroger and 32 other retailers settled
antitrust claims against StarKist for conspiring with other tuna producers—Chicken of the Sea and
Bumble Bee—to fix the price of canned tuna fish. Starkist had settled earlier with Walmart, Target,
and Sam’s Club. See Armental (2019) and Ritenbaugh (2019).
23The plaintiffs’ general counsel may also play an active role in the litigation. The private
contracts between the plaintiffs and the lawyers do not require approval by the court.
24See Eisenberg et al. (2017). In their sample of 458 class-action cases, 54% of the attorney
fees were determined by the percentage method, 38% by the percentage method combined with a
lodestar check, and about 6% with the pure lodestar method.
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per-unit cost of litigation. Second, class actions create a separation of ownership
and control of the litigation. This may allow the class-action lawyers to divert the
litigation surplus to themselves and possibly to third parties. We will explore the
firms’ private incentives to block class actions by requiring consumers to sign class
action waivers, and the social welfare implications.
3.1 Economies of Scale
Economies of scale in class-action litigation are well-documented in the empirical
literature.25 Eisenberg and Miller (2010), for instance, find that, in percentage terms,
the average lawsuit in their sample had an attorney fee-to-recovery ratio of about
25%.26 This is significantly lower than the typical contingent fee percentage of 33%
to 40% in individual litigation. In addition, the attorney fee-to-recovery ratio and
the ratio of the other litigation expenses to the recovery (court fees, travel expenses,
expert witness fees, etc.) were decreasing in the recovery. For class action lawsuits
where the gross recovery was less than $1.1 million, the attorney fees were about 38%
of the recovery; for gross recoveries greater than $175 million the attorney fees were
12% of the recovery.27
In our benchmark model, consumer-plaintiffs could bring private antitrust lawsuits
at a cost of kp (per unit). Now suppose that consumer-plaintiffs can form a class action
and obtain economies of scale. When organized as a class, the per-unit litigation cost
falls to kcp < kp.
28 Suppose further that the class-action lawyers are compensated
for their out-of-pocket expenses and receive “reasonable” compensation for their time
and effort. At the conclusion of litigation, the court allows the attorney to collect kcp.
29
(Agency problems, and surplus extraction by class-action lawyers, will be discussed
shortly.) Since class actions achieve economies of scale, they clearly serve the interests
of the consumer-plaintiffs ex post. The attorney, working on behalf of the consumer-
plaintiffs, will bring a class-action lawsuit when θ(p − c) − kcp > 0. The following
proposition describes how the firms’ private incentive to block or allow class actions
25In theory, consolidation could lead to either higher or lower expenditures on litigation. Insofar
as the fixed costs of litigation may be shared, the costs as a share of the recovery would fall. On the
the other hand, since the stakes are larger, the private incentives of the plaintiffs to spend money to
win the case would rise. See Rosenberg and Spier (2014).
26Similar results were found by Fitzpatrick (2010).
27This pattern is confirmed by Fitzpatrick (2010) and others.
28When plaintiffs’ multiple lawsuits are consolidated into a single class action, the defendants
may also enjoy the economies of scale. We could easily allow the defendant-firms’ litigation cost to
decrease to kcd < kd, but the substantive results will not change.
29This is consistent with the lodestar method and the percentage method with a lodestar adjust-
ment. With a pure percentage approach, then percentage β =
kcp
θ(p−c) would allow the lawyer to just
break even. The lawyer may try to convince the judge to pay more than this, of course.
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can either be aligned with or diverge from the social welfare objective.
Proposition 2. Suppose that class actions lower the unit cost of bringing private
antitrust lawsuits from kp to k
c

















kd. The threshold kp exists and satisfies kp ∈ (k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c)−c))
when µ ∈ (0, 1] and kp = k̂p(µ) when µ = 0.
1. If kp < k̂p(µ), then firms have a (weak) incentive to allow class actions and,
when they do allow class actions, this is socially efficient. Firms’ incentive to
allow class actions is strict when µ ∈ (0, 1], and when µ = 0, the firms are
indifferent.
2. If kp ∈ [k̂p(µ), kp), then there exists a threshold kp ∈ (0, k̂p(µ)) where firms block
(allow) class actions if kcp > kp (k
c
p ≤ kp).30 When kcp ≤ k̂p(µ), firms’ allowing
(blocking) class actions is socially inefficient (efficient). When kcp > k̂p(µ),
firms’ blocking class actions is socially inefficient.
3. If kp ≥ kp, then firms will block class actions. Firms’ blocking class actions is
weakly socially efficient (inefficient) when kcp > k̂p(µ) (k
c
p ≤ k̂p(µ)).
Although the proof is somewhat involved, the reasoning behind the statements
Proposition 2 is fairly straightforward. Whether the firms will block or allow class
action lawsuits depends on the consumers’ individual litigation cost. The easiest case
is when kp < k̂p(µ). In this case, consumer-plaintiffs will bring individual lawsuits if
class actions are blocked. Because litigation takes place in equilibrium and the firms
treat that as another cost of doing business, it is in their interest to lower the litigation
cost, for instance, by allowing consumers to bring a class action. Interestingly, as the
individual litigation cost decreases from kp to k
c
p, not only will the firms’ aggregate
profits increase, but the social welfare also increases. The increase in social welfare
comes from the fact that the deadweight loss from litigation has gotten smaller and
also that the lower marginal cost leads to a lower equilibrium price, thereby serving
a larger consumer base.
At the opposite end, when kp ≥ kp, because the consumers’ litigation cost (with-
out class action) is sufficiently high and firms’ profits will only decrease when the
consumers’ litigation cost decreases, firms have no incentive to allow class actions.
Whether the firms’ imposing class action waivers is socially efficient depends on the
magnitude of kcp. If k
c
p < k̂p, allowing class actions will decrease social welfare (from
30The threshold kp will depend on kp. We have suppressed the functional form for the sake of
cleaner exposition.
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Corollary 1), and the firms’ imposing class action waivers is socially efficient. On the
other hand, if kcp ≥ k̂p(µ), by allowing class actions, while still keeping litigation off
the equilibrium path, the equilibrium price will (at least weakly) decrease, thereby
increasing social welfare. The firms’ imposing class action waivers in that setting is
socially inefficient.
Finally, when the consumers’ litigation cost (without class action) falls in the
middle region, k̂p(µ) ≤ kp < kp, whether or not the firms will require a class action
waiver depends on both kp and the magnitude of k
c
p. If, for instance, k
c
p ≥ k̂p(µ),
allowing class actions will only decrease the firms’ profits. On the other hand, if kcp is
sufficiently close to zero, firms will want to allow class actions in equilibrium. When
class actions are allowed, however, social welfare is strictly lower (per Corollary 1).
This is because, without the class action, firms are already charging a sufficiently
low price to keep litigation off the equilibrium path and, therefore, social welfare is
relatively high. When class actions are allowed, social welfare decreases due to all the
litigation cost in equilibrium.
3.2 Surplus Extraction by Lawyers and Third Parties
There is a general concern that class-action attorneys engage self-dealing behavior and
inflate their fees without sufficient oversight by their clients or the courts.31 Class
actions may be prone to agency problems, since the consumer-plaintiffs formally own
the legal claims but the class-action attorneys control the litigation. Consistent with
this view, some empirical studies suggest that judges with congested dockets tend to
grant higher fees to lawyers (Helland and Klick, 2007). Other scholars point to the
fact that the average attorney fee-to-recovery ratio for class-action attorneys of 25%
is smaller than 33%, the standard contingent fee for individual litigation, as evidence
that class-action attorneys are not overpaid in the traditional sense.32
In addition to class action lawyers, third parties may capture surplus from class-
action litigation. For example, the courts often approve so-called “cy pres” distribu-
tions of unclaimed funds to charities and non-profit organizations, sometimes hand-
picked by class-action attorneys.33 For example, in a class action lawsuit brought
against NASCAR merchandise vendors alleging price fixing, the court approved the
class-action lawyer’s request to distribute unpaid funds to nine charities including
31See, for example, Beisner et al. (2005), who state that: “[O]ne of the most heavily criticized
class-action abuses has been the use of class-action settlements to generate huge fees for lawyers
and little or nothing for the allegedly injured consumers.” For more discussion on the debate see
Fitzpatrick (2010).
32Whether class action attorneys are overpaid on average remains an open empirical question.
33See Redish et al. (2010).
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the Lawyers Foundation of Georgia and the American Red Cross.34 In other circum-
stances, the court may order that unclaimed class-action recoveries go to the state for
use as either general funds or for a particular purpose (“conditional escheat”).35 Fi-
nally, even in the absence of court-supervised distribution of recovery, non-meritorious
plaintiffs’ filing and capturing a portion of class recovery can also be thought of as
third party capture of surplus.
We now adapt the benchmark model from Section 2 to explore the positive and
normative implications of surplus extraction by class-action lawyers and third parties.
Suppose that there is a profitable litigation opportunity, θ(p − c) − kp > 0, where
as before kp includes both the out-of-pocket litigation expenses and the opportunity
cost of the lawyer’s time. Suppose that net litigation surplus, θ(p− c)− kp, is shared
by the consumer-plaintiffs, the class-action attorney, and third parties (e.g. charities
and the state). Specifically, assume that fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of the net surplus is
captured by the lawyer and the third parties, and the residual 1 − γ goes to the
consumer plaintiffs.36 Note that the consumer’s net return from litigation ex post,
(1− γ)(θ(p− c)− kp), is decreasing in the parameter γ.
Surplus extraction by class-action lawyers and third parties ex post affects the
purchase decisions of consumers ex ante. As in Section 2, the parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] is
the degree to which the consumers are forward looking and anticipate being plaintiffs
in litigation. When class-action attorneys and/or third parties capture a share γ of
the litigation surplus, this dilutes the consumer’s expected share from µ to µ(1− γ).
The effective price (as perceived by consumers at the time of purchase) is:
p− µ(1− γ) max{θ(p− c)− kp, 0}. (9)
When γ = 0, so the consumer-plaintiffs capture the entire litigation surplus, the
effective price is exactly as in equation (4). When γ = 1, the class-action lawyers
and third parties capture the litigation surplus so x(p) = p. More generally, holding
the actual price p fixed, the effective price perceived by consumers is an increasing
function of γ. Surplus extraction by lawyers and third parties is in effect creating an
“ad valorem tax” on consumers.
The firms’ aggregate profit function is similar to Lemma 1 above. If θ(p−c)−kp ≤
34See In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 139599 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Other examples include Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4911 (HB), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48151 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) and In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163
(3d Cir. 2013).
35See for example West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 87 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) and In
re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1984).
36Our findings are robust to the particular method of compensation for the lawyer (lodestar,
percentage based, etc.). A pure percentage fee β that satisfies θβ(p− c)−kp = γ[θ(p− c)−kp] gives
the lawyer a share γ of the net surplus. Rearranging terms gives β = (1− γ) kpθ(p−c) + γ.
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0, lawsuits are not brought and the firms’ profits are Π(p, c). If θ(p − c) − kp > 0,
lawsuits are brought and firms’ profits are:
Π(x(p), c+ k)− (1− µ(1− γ))D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp] (10)
where x(p) = p − µ(1 − γ)[θ(p − c) − kp]. This is equivalent to equation (6), except
that µ replaced by µ(1−γ). Firm profits are reduced to reflect the value captured by
the lawyers and/or third parties.37 The firms’ pricing strategy and profits are exactly
as characterized in Proposition 1, except that the parameter µ is reduced to µ(1−γ).
The firms clearly have a (weak) incentive to block class-action attorneys and third
parties from capturing the net litigation surplus. The lawyers and third parties are
imposing a type of “ad valorem tax” on consumers which harms firm profits ex ante.
Are the firms’ incentives to block class actions aligned with social welfare? To answer
this question, we will assume that all the recipients of the litigation surplus—the
consumers’ future selves, the lawyers, and any third parties (charities and/or the
state)—are represented in the social welfare function.38 The following proposition
describes how the firms’ private incentive to block class actions may either be aligned
with or diverge from the social welfare objective.
Proposition 3. Suppose that class actions allow lawyers and third parties to capture
a share γ ∈ (0, 1] of the litigation surplus.39 If consumers are completely myopic,
µ = 0, then firm profits and social welfare are the same with or without class actions.
Suppose consumers are not completely myopic, µ ∈ (0, 1]. The threshold defined in
Lemma 2 is lower when class actions are allowed, k̂p(µ(1− γ)) < k̂p(µ).
1. If kp < k̂p(µ(1 − γ)) then firms have a private incentive to block class actions




2. If kp ∈ [k̂p(µ(1 − γ)), k̂p(µ)] then firms have a private incentive to block class
actions and this is socially inefficient.
3. If kp > k̂p(µ) then firms and society are indifferent about allowing and blocking
class actions.
37The value captured ex post by the lawyers and third parties is γD(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp], and the
unanticipated value captured by consumers is (1 − µ)(1 − γ)D(x(p))[θ(p − c) − kp]. Adding these
two expressions gives the equation above.
38Then, putting aside the costs of litigation and any distortionary effects on the market, the
allocation of the litigation surplus γ has a neutral effect on social welfare.
39Class actions do not change the attorney’s opportunity cost of litigation, kcp = kp, but may
increase the attorney’s fee. The surplus captured by attorneys is included in social welfare.
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So long as consumers are not completely myopic, µ ∈ (0, 1], the firms’ profits
are smaller when lawyers and third parties capture a greater share of the litigation
surplus. This is happening because value capture by the lawyers and others reduces
the rebate that is received by consumers ex post. This reduces the consumers’ demand
and lowers the firms’ profits. If µ = 0, then consumers do not expect to participate
in litigation in the future. So, from the firms’ perspective, it does not matter if
the litigation surplus is captured by the consumers themselves or by the class-action
attorneys and/or third parties.
The capture of surplus by lawyers and third parties has ambiguous effects on social
welfare. First, as in Section 2, when the costs of litigation are below a threshold then
the firms will raise their prices and tolerate litigation in equilibrium. If class-action
lawyers and third parties capture litigation surplus, then consumers will purchase less,
creating a larger deadweight loss. On the other hand, insofar as surplus extraction
reduces the tolerance of the firms for litigation, then the potential for value capture
by class-action attorneys and third parties will have a deterrent effect on price fixing.
The firms will lower their prices to avoid class actions, and social welfare will rise.
For the sake of tractability, we have examined two issues, the economies of scale
and agency problems from allowing class actions, in isolation. Although the analysis
is more involved, it is fairly straightforward to see the impact of combining both
issues.40 In general, as the agency problem becomes more severe (i.e., as γ rises),
the range of kp where the firms would allow class actions would get smaller. At one
extreme, even though the consumers are not completely myopic (µ > 0), when γ is
above a certain threshold (but less than one), firms will never allow class actions in
equilibrium, and this may be socially inefficient. When γ is below that threshold, we
will be back to the analysis in Proposition 2. As in Proposition 2, firms’ incentives
of allowing class actions may or may not align with social welfare.
4 Further Considerations
Having presented the main analysis, we now consider several extensions. They
include: (1) settlement of credible lawsuits, (2) fee shifting between the plaintiff-
consumers and the defendant-firms, where the loser pays the fees of the winner (im-
position of the “English Rule” or the one-way fee-shifting under the Clayton Act);
(3) damages multipliers, such as treble damages; (4) combining private litigation with
public enforcement; and (5) sustaining collusive equilibrium through repeat play. The
formal analyses and proofs for these extensions may be found in Appendix B.
40The complexity stems from the fact that, now we will have two separate sets of profit and social
welfare curves (with two separate k̂p’s). A more complete analysis is available from the authors.
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4.1 Settlement
In the main model, cases go to trial whenever the firms charge p > c + kp/θ. Since
trials are costly, the firms and the consumers have a joint incentive to settle out of
court to avoid the costs of litigation (k = kp+kd). When our framework is extended to
include out-of-court settlement, new insights emerge. If consumers fully anticipate the
future settlement rebate (µ = 1), the firms can realize the unconstrained monopoly
profit, with or without class action waivers. When consumers do not fully anticipate
the settlement rebate (µ < 1) then the firms’ profits lower and firms may (depending
on kcp) have an incentive to impose class action waivers.
Suppose that information is symmetric at the time of settlement bargaining: all
the relevant parameters (including whether the consumers made a purchase) are com-
mon knowledge. We model settlement negotiations using simple Nash bargaining
where α ∈ [0, 1] represents the defendants’ (firms’) bargaining power.41
If p ≤ c + kp/θ, the plaintiffs do not have a credible threat to go to trial, so
no lawsuits are brought and the aggregate firm profits are Π(p, c). If p > c + kp/θ,
the plaintiffs have a credible threat to go to trial. The least the plaintiffs would
be willing to accept to settle the case is s(p) = θ(p − c) − kp, and the most the
defendants would be willing to pay is s(p) = θ(p− c) + kd. The case therefore settles
for s(p) = αs(p) + (1− α)s(p), or:
s(p) = θ(p− c) + kd − α(kp + kd). (11)
Note that the firms capture fraction α of the bargaining surplus, k = kp + kd. Since
the case will settle for s(p), the effective price perceived by the consumers is
x(p) = p− µs(p). (12)
If µ = 1, the consumers are fully forward-looking and anticipate the “settlement
rebate” of s(p) at the time of purchase. If µ < 1, the settlement rebate is less-than-
fully anticipated. Using (11) and (12), aggregate firm profits when p > c + kp/θ
are
Π(x(p), c)− (1− µ)D(x(p))s(p). (13)
It is interesting to compare the profit function in (13) to the profit function in
(6) when settlement is impossible. In (13), the first term Π(x(p), c) represents the
profits of a monopolist with the effective price of x(p) and the production cost of c.
By contrast, in (6), the first term Π(x(p), c+k) includes the cost of litigation k. This
41This is equivalent to a random-offeror model where α is the probability that the defendant
makes the offer. One could also use an alternating offer bargaining protocol; different discount
factors for the consumers and firms would yield an uneven division of surplus.
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difference makes sense, since the parties avoid the litigation costs by setting out of
court. The second term in (13) is the value captured by myopic consumers. When
µ < 1, the settlement s(p) is less-than-fully anticipated by consumers at the time of
purchase, and this has a negative effect on the firms’ aggregate profits.
Equation (13) implies that when consumers are fully forward-looking, µ = 1, the
firms obtain the unconstrained monopoly profit regardless of the litigation costs (kp
and kd) and the bargaining power α. With frictionless Nash bargaining, the firms
can simply raise the actual price of the product to the point where the effective price
x(p) = pm(c). Since consumers fully anticipate the settlement rebate s(p), the firms
obtain the unconstrained monopoly profit Π(pm(c), c). When consumers are at least
party myopic, µ < 1, then the profits in (13) are lower than Π(pm(c), c).
Appendix B shows that when the plaintiffs’ cost of litigation is below a threshold
value, the firms will accept lawsuits (and subsequent settlement) as a cost of doing
business. Interestingly, in contrast to our earlier results, firm profits and social welfare
increase when the plaintiffs’ litigation cost kp rises. This happens because the settle-
ment value in (11) falls when kp rises, and so the unanticipated transfer of value from
the firm to the myopic consumers is smaller. So, the firms and society are better off
when class actions are blocked. When the plaintiffs’ cost kp rises above the threshold
value, the firms will lower the actual price and push litigation and settlement off the
equilibrium path. The firms have a socially excessive incentive to impose class action
waivers on consumers in this case.
4.2 Fee Shifting
In the main analysis, the plaintiff and the defendant were responsible for paying their
own litigation costs regardless of the outcome at trial. This is the rule typically used in
the United States (the “American Rule”). Suppose instead that the loser in litigation
must reimburse the winner for the litigation costs (the “English Rule”). If we let θ ∈
(0, 1) represent the plaintiff’s probability of winning at trial then, with fee-shifting,
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s expected litigation costs become kerp = (1− θ)(kp + kd)
and kerd = θ(kp + kd), respectively.
A change from the American Rule to the English Rule may increase or decrease
prices, profits, and social welfare depending on whether θ is smaller than or greater
than kd
kp+kd
. If θ > kd
kp+kd
, the plaintiff is likely to win at trial and the plaintiff’s
expected litigation costs are lower under the English Rule than the American Rule.
If θ < kd
kp+kd
, the plaintiff is likely to lose at trial and the plaintiff’s expected litigation
costs are higher under the English Rule. All of the results of the benchmark model
will continue to hold, with the threshold k̂erp (µ), determined by equation (8), but
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using kerp and k
er
d , instead of kp and kd, respectively.
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Before we proceed, one unique aspect about private antitrust lawsuits in the U.S.
is that it utilizes one-way fee-shifting for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Under Clayton
Act §4(a), when the plaintiffs prevail, they are entitled to recover “the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorneys fee” from the defendants. The defendants, on the
other hand, do not recover their expenses from the plaintiffs when they prevail and
are subject to the American rule. With plaintiff-friendly, one-way fee-shifting, the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s expected litigation costs become kcap = (1− θ)kp and kcad =
kd+θkp, respectively. The threshold k̂
ca
p (µ) is determined by equation (8), and will of
course be the same as the value k̂p(µ) in Proposition 1. Since k
ca
p = (1−θ)kp < kp, the
threshold value for the plaintiff’s litigation cost will be higher. With lower plaintiff
litigation cost, keeping litigation off the equilibrium path becomes less attractive for
the firms and they become more likely to allow litigation in equilibrium.
4.3 Damage Multipliers
In private antitrust suits, plaintiffs are sometimes entitled to recover multiple times
the actual harm suffered (e.g., treble damages under Clayton Act §4(a)). While
multiple damages provide a stronger ex post incentive to the consumers to bring suit,
previous literature has cast doubt on whether it works as deterrence (Easterbrook
1985; Salant 1987; Baker 1988). The basic story, similar to ours with fully forward-
looking consumers (µ = 1), is that, with higher damages, consumers would become
willing to pay more for the product and the firms can charge a higher price ex ante, so
that, in the end, firms realize the same expected monopoly profit and the consumers
obtain the same expected surplus. What is important in the analysis, however, are
the assumptions that (1) the ex post private litigation is costless and (2) there is less
than full deterrence (θ < 1).43
In the main model, θ was the expected fraction of the overcharge (p− c) awarded
to the plaintiffs in litigation. We can reflect a damages multiplier by adjusting θ.
For example, if there is a 25% chance of winning the cases, and only compensatory
damages are awarded (100% of the overcharge), then θ = .25×1 = .25. If, on the other
hand, treble damages are awarded (300% of the overcharge), then θ = .25× 3 = .75.
The bigger the damages multiplier, the higher the θ. With a sufficiently generous
damages multiplier, we may even have θ ≥ 1.
42In Appendix B, we show that k̂erp (µ) may be larger than or smaller than k̂p(µ), depending on
the parameter θ.
43This is similar to our extension in Section 4.1 where all cases settle and the parties do not incur
any litigation cost in equilibrium. There, when consumers are fully forward-looking (µ = 1), the
firms achieve monopoly profits Π(pm(c), c) for all θ < 1.
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Recall that Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium price, litigation decisions,
firm profits, and social welfare when θ < 1. If consumers are fully forward-looking,
µ = 1, and kp < k̂p(µ), the neutrality result holds: as θ rises, firms increase the price
to offset the more generous rebate and earn the same aggregate profit. However, when
θ rises the threshold k̂p(µ) rises as well. Intuitively, as θ rises, pushing litigation off the
equilibrium path becomes less attractive because the profit margin (kp/θ) decreases,
so there is more litigation in equilibrium. This also implies that, with respect to
class action waivers, in a broader parameter space (or kp space), firms will have an
incentive to reduce the consumers’ litigation cost (kp) which will also increase welfare.
If θ < 1 and consumers are not fully forward-looking (µ < 1), however, the
neutrality result no longer holds: equilibrium prices, litigation decisions, profits and
welfare depend on the parameter θ. In case 1 of Proposition 1, as θ rises, because the
myopic consumers’ purchase decision is unaffected by the change in θ but the firms’
expected litigation payment (θ(p− c) + kd) rises, and their aggregate profit falls. At
the same time, pushing litigation off the equilibrium path also becomes unattractive,
for the same reason as with the fully forward-looking consumers. This makes the
effect of a change in θ on k̂p ambiguous. For instance, when θ is relatively small,
a small increase can have a big effect on the profits the firms can earn by pushing
litigation off the equilibrium path but a relatively small effect on the profits in case
they allow litigation. The effects can be reversed when θ is relatively large. The
effects on the firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers are similarly ambiguous.
Finally, if θ ≥ 1, then one can show that k̂p(µ) = 0; it is no longer in the
firms’ interest to allow litigation in equilibrium regardless of µ. If the firms set a
price p > c + kp/θ then lawsuits are brought and the firms realize a negative profit.
However, firms can still set p = c + kp/θ, push litigation off the equilibrium path
and earn positive profits (with the profit margin of kp/θ). Given that the size of
consumers’ litigation cost directly translates to the size of profit margins, firms will
have a strong incentive to increase kp as much as they can. With θ ≥ 1, therefore,
firms will surely impose class action waivers on consumers and block class actions.
This is socially inefficient since it allows the firms to charge a higher price and this
generates a larger deadweight loss.
4.4 Public Enforcement
As discussed earlier, most antitrust lawsuits in the US are pursued by private parties
independently of any government action.44 At the same time, there are also many
44See Crane (2011), Lande and Davis (2007), and Kauper and Snyder (1986). In 2018, for
instance, there were 318 antitrust class action complaints filed and $5.3 billion in private antitrust
settlements. See Davis and Kohles (2019). In contrast, the U.S. Department of Justice filed 18
criminal antitrust cases in 2018 and obtained $172 million in criminal fines and penalties. See
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examples of private antitrust lawsuits that follow on the enforcement actions by the
DOJ or the FTC.45 In this section, we examine the possibility of private antitrust
lawsuits piggy-backing on public enforcement efforts.46 Our analysis, while simple
and stylized, shows that our main insights hold, albeit with some new and interesting
variations.
Suppose that a public enforcement agency is tasked with detecting and penalizing
price-fixing violations. When the firms collude and set a market price p > c, they are
detected with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) and pay a monetary fine of τD(x(p))(p− c) +F ,
where τ ∈ [0, 1] stands for pro rata penalty and F ≥ 0 stands for fixed penalty.47
Without any private antitrust lawsuits, when firms collude at p > c, they expect to
realize expected aggregate profits of (1−στ)D(p)(p− c)−σF . Note that if the firms
decide to collude, they will charge the monopoly price pm(c). The threat of public en-
forcement will deter collusion if the fine is sufficiently high: σF > (1−στ)Π(pm(c), c).
When σF < (1− στ)Π(pm(c), c), on the other hand, public enforcement by itself will
not deter collusion. In this case, the threat of follow-on private antitrust lawsuits
may serve a valuable complementary role to public enforcement.
Regarding private enforcement, suppose that private plaintiffs enjoy spillovers
from public enforcement. If collusion is detected by the public enforcement agency,
consumers and their attorneys have the option to bring private antitrust lawsuits.48
As in the main analysis, when p ≤ c + kp/θ, consumers do not bring suit and the
firms realize an aggregate profit of D(p)(1 − στ)(p − c) − σF . If p > c + kp/θ, on
the other hand, after collusion is detected by the public enforcement authority (with
probability σ), consumers exercise the option to bring a follow-on private antitrust
lawsuit. At the time of purchase, the effective price perceived by the consumers
https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts.
45Interestingly, there are also cases where the government piggybacks on the private antitrust
actions. See for example United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), Kauper
and Snyder (1986, 1169), and Lande and Davis (2008, 897 and Table 3).
46See the interesting recent work of Katsoulacos et al. (2020), and the literature review therein.
Future work might also explore leniency programs and rewards for whistleblowers. For recent surveys
and discussion see Marx et al. (2015) and Spagnolo and Marvão (2016).
47For simplicity, we assume that the fine depends on the actual quantity purchased by consumers
and that τ and σ are invariant with respect to p. For more general representations see Bos et al.
(2018) and Katsoulacos et al. (2020). If we have a more progressive penalty rate, public enforcement
will have a stronger deterrence effect. These considerations are beyond the scope of the current paper.
We also assume, for simplicity, that public enforcement does not incur any dispute resolution costs
like the private actions.
48For simplicity, we assume that if the public enforcement agency does not detect wrongdoing
then private antitrust lawsuits are too weak to pursue independently but allowing for more general
interdependence will not change the main result.
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includes the expected rebate from future litigation:
x(p) = p− σµ(θ(p− c)− kp).
Note that a higher detection probability σ benefits the private plaintiffs ex post.
Taking into account the firms’ litigation costs kd, the private damage payments, and
public penalties, aggregate firm profits, when p > c+ kp/θ, may be written as:
D(x(p))[(1− σ(τ + θ))(p− c)− σkd]− σF.
From the expression, when σ(τ + θ) ≥ 1, the firms’ profits are strictly negative for all
p > c + kp/θ. As for the case of damage multipliers, the compound effect of public
and private sanctions can create a very strong incentive for the firms to lower their
prices to avoid private antitrust litigation.
Appendix B shows that our core insights extend to settings where private antitrust
lawsuits piggyback on government actions. When public enforcement efforts are in-
sufficient to by themselves deter cartel activity, private enforcement actions can either
increase or decrease social welfare. As in the main model, if the consumer-plaintiffs’
cost of litigation kp are in a middle region, the threat of private antitrust actions will
constrain the cartel’s prices and increase social welfare. When kp is in a low region,
the firms will treat the future litigation costs and private antitrust damages as a cost
of doing business and social welfare falls. Interestingly, in the low region, the analy-
sis shows that a higher pro rata penalty rate (τ) will lead the firms to increase the
equilibrium price and further reduce social welfare. The reason is that, unlike the
damage payments in private actions, a larger pro rata penalty τ does not function as
a “rebate” to the consumers. Rather, a larger pro rata penalty increases the effective
marginal cost for the firms without any corresponding increase in demand.
4.5 Sustaining Collusion through Repeat Play
The final variation we examine is how firms can sustain collusion through repeat
play. Our main analysis assumed that the cartel members act as a single entity when
setting price, and therefore implicitly assumed that the firms have an enforcement
technology to support the joint profit-maximizing pricing scheme in Proposition 1.
This variation explores the repeated pricing game where the firms choose prices at
discrete intervals. We will assume that the cartel members have a common discount
rate between rounds, r > 0, have unlimited capacity to serve the market, and that
deviations are easily detected. If a cartel member deviates, then the firms use grim-
trigger punishment strategies where the firms charge p = c forever (Nash reversion).49
49Grim-trigger strategies create the most favorable condition for collusion.
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One can easily construct the conditions for sustaining the collusive equilibrium
when a firm who deviates from the collusive agreement is exempt from antitrust
liability.50 Recall in Proposition 1, when kp ≥ k̂p(µ), the firms charge p = min{c +
kp/θ, p
m(c)} and deter lawsuits. If they can sustain this outcome, each firm could
earn per-period profits of Π(p, c)/N .51 The most profitable unilateral deviation is
to undercut the market by a small amount, ε > 0, and capture the entire market.
The deviating firm would gain Π(p − ε, c) − Π(p, c)/N in that round but would lose
Π(p, c)/N in all future rounds. This deviation is profitable when the short run-gain
exceeds the long run loss: Π(p− ε, c)−Π(p, c)/N > 1
rN
Π(p, c). Taking ε to zero, the
outcome in Proposition 1 can be sustained through repeat play when the discount
rate is below a threshold, r ≤ 1
N−1 .
Now suppose, instead, that kp < k̂p(µ). According to Proposition 1, the firms
would charge an effective price of pm(c + k̃) > pm(c) and accommodate litigation
in equilibrium. If they can sustain this outcome, the firms could earn profits of
Π(pm(c + k̃), c + k̃)/N each. Undercutting the cartel’s price slightly is no longer the
most profitable deviation. Since (by assumption) the deviating firm avoids litigation
and its associated costs—and the consumers do not expect to receive any litigation
rebate if they purchase from the deviating firm—the most profitable deviation is to
charge pm(c). Notice that since the deviating firm will not be sued, its short-run
profits, Π(pm(c), c), exceed Π(pm(c + k̃), c + k̃). The incentive to cheat is relatively




The paper has examined the effect of class actions and class action waivers in the
context of private antitrust lawsuits, in particular, lawsuits against collusion among
competitors. Class action waivers, often through mandatory individual arbitration
clauses, have received much attention especially since the U.S. Supreme Court has
endorsed such private ordering mechanism. The paper has shown that whether the
firms will require the consumers to waive their right to bring a class action depends
on the consumers’ individual litigation cost. Furthermore, depending on the circum-
stances, firms’ incentive in seeking class action waivers can be aligned with the social
50Appendix B also considers the case where the deviating firm is liable for overcharges. It is not
entirely clear whether a deviating firm should be subject to antitrust liability. On the one hand,
a deviating firm is technically not “colluding” with the other firms, but, on the other, when the
deviating firm slightly undercuts the collusive price, it may deemed to be “coordinating” with other
firms. See also Bos et al. (2018).
51Equal division of the market creates the most favorable condition for collusion.
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objective. This is the case, for instance, when the consumers’ litigation costs are
relatively low so that the firms treat litigation in equilibrium as just another cost
of doing business. The paper has also shown that the core results remain robust to
out-of-court settlement, fee shifting, damage multipliers, combining private antitrust
litigation with public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play.
While the current focus of the paper was on price fixing and private antitrust
lawsuits, the analysis is applicable to other settings where the firms’ pre-sale behavior
can affect the terms of trade. Examples include product design (product liability
and consumer financial contracts), false advertising (Concepcion), employment (Epic
Systems), and unlawful monopolization (Italian Colors). In the products liability
setting, for instance, firms may fundamentally lack sufficient ex ante incentives to
design safer products.52 The class action can be an effective mechanism for aligning
the firm’s private incentives with those of society. If firms can block consumers from
using the class action mechanism, forcing them to pursue individual actions, then
product safety is clearly compromised. Firms also have a strong incentive to minimize
or eliminate product liability lawsuits ex post.53 We plan to broaden our analysis to
other settings where pre- and post-sale behavior of the firm could play an important
role in choosing the litigation regime (e.g., asking for a class action waiver).
52In Choi and Spier (2014), competitive firms reduce safety levels in order to cream-skim the
low risk consumers. In Hua and Spier (2020), firms tailor the product to suit the needs of the
marginal consumer instead of the average consumer. Safety is suboptimal if the marginal consumer
has a lower willingness to pay for safety than the average consumer. In Hamada (1975), consumers
systematically underestimate product risks. In these and other settings, products liability induces
firms to design safer products.
53The ex post incentive to minimize or eliminate product liability lawsuits for the firm that has
produced a (likely) defective product is clear. Even for the firm that has produced a (likely) non-
defective product, to the extent that there could be frivolous litigation, the firm would want to
minimize or eliminate product liability lawsuit ex post.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The case where p ≤ c + kp/θ was proven in the text. Suppose
p > c+ kp/θ. We now show that (5) and (6) are equivalent. Rewrite the second part
of the profit function from (6) as:
D(x(p))(x(p)− c− kp − kd)− (1− µ)D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp].
Substituting for x(p) from (4), this becomes
D(x(p))[p− µ(θ(p− c)− kp)− c− kp − kd]− (1− µ)D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp]
= D(x(p))[p− c− kp − kd]− µD(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp]− (1− µ)D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp]
= D(x(p))[p− c− kp − kd]−D(x(p))[θ(p− c)− kp]
= D(x(p))[p− c− (θ(p− c) + kd)].
These are the firm’s aggregate profits in (5). Piecewise continuity is immediate. Now
consider the comparative statics for µ. From (4) we see that x(p) is weakly decreasing
in µ. Therefore D(x(p)) is weakly increasing in µ, so the firm profits in (5) are weakly
increasing in µ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider first the left-hand side of (8). When kp = 0, the left-
hand side of (8) is Π(c, c) = 0. When kp = θ(p
m(c)−c) the left-hand side is Π(pm(c), c),
the monopoly profit without the threat of litigation. The left-hand side of (8) is
strictly increasing in kp in the range (0, θ(p
m(c)− c)).54
We will now show that the right-hand side of (8) is positive, decreasing in kp, and
smaller than Π(pm(c), c). To facilitate this, we will rewrite the profit function. Using
(5), we can rewrite the right-hand side of (8) as
max
x




{D(x)(1− θ) (p(x)− c)− kd} . (15)
Substituting the expression for p(x) from (7) and rearranging terms, the right-hand















54When kp > θ(p
m(c)− c)) then the left-hand side is decreasing in kp.
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This is strictly positive (since x is chosen to maximize profits); strictly decreasing in
kp (by the envelope theorem); and smaller than Π(p
m(c), c). Therefore an implicit
solution k̂p ∈ (0, θ(pm(c)− c)) exists and is unique.
Now, let’s turn to the comparative statics and show that k̂p is an increasing
function of µ. Let x∗(kp, µ), which we write as x
∗ for brevity, be the value of x that
maximizes (16). Then equation (8) defining k̂p may be written as:



















x∗ − c− µk̂p
]
−D(x∗)kd. (18)








∗)[θ(x∗ − c)− k̂p]dµ.













θ(x∗ − c)− k̂p
)]
dµ.
Since c + k̂p/θ < p




/dx > 0 so the expression in
brackets on the left-hand side is strictly positive. Now consider the right-hand side.
Since x∗ maximizes (16), we have x∗ > pm(c) > c + k̂p/θ, and so θ(x
∗ − c) − k̂p >
θ(pm(c) − c) − k̂p > 0. So, the expression in brackets on the right-hand side is
strictly positive, too. This concludes the proof that k̂p(µ) is implicitly defined and
dk̂p/dµ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let’s start with case 3. If the firms charge price pm(c) then
consumers do not bring suit because kp ≥ θ(pm(c)− c) and the aggregate profits are
Π(pm(c), c). From (6) we know that other prices lead to lower profits.
Now, consider Case 2. Since kp ∈ [k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c) − c))), we have that c + kp/θ ∈
[c + k̂p(µ)/θ, p
m(c)). Since consumers do not sue the firms when p ≤ c + kp/θ and
55Using the envelope theorem, we may disregard the effects of changes of k̂p and µ through x
∗.
A2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329316
36
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 180 [2020]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/180
profits are increasing in p in this range, p = c+ kp/θ is the most profitable price that
deters litigation. If the firm charge p > c + kp/θ then consumers bring lawsuits. (8)
implies that this would lead to lower aggregate profits.
Finally, consider Case 1. If kp < k̂p(µ) defined in Lemma 2 then the firms will raise
the price to p > c+kp/θ and accommodate lawsuits in equilibrium. Using (16) above,















m(c + k̃) is the effective price that maximizes firm
profits. This verifies firm profits in Case 1 of the proposition.
The comparative statics for Case 2 and Case 3 are immediate. Consider Case 1. Social
welfare may be written W (pm(c + k̃), c + k).56 An increase in kp will impact social
welfare through both k and k̃. First, when kp rises, the litigation costs k = kp + kd
rise and social welfare falls. Second, when kp rises, k̃ rises so p
m(c+ k̃) rises and social
welfare falls. Now consider a change in µ. An increase in µ may either increase or
decrease social welfare: if kp
kd
< θ





then k̃ rises and social welfare falls. Now consider aggregate firm profits. Using (18)
the aggregate profits may be written as
1−θ
1−µθD(p
m(·)) [pm(·)− c− µkp]−D(pm(·))kd, (19)
where pm(·) = pm(c + k̃). We first consider a change in kp. Holding µ ∈ (0, 1] fixed,
firm profits are a decreasing function of kp. When µ = 0, firm profits do not depend
on kp. Now consider a change in µ. Differentiating firm profits with respect to µ, and
applying the envelope theorem, the slope is
1−θ
(1−µθ)2D(p
m(·)) [θ(pm(·)− c)− kp] . (20)
This is positive because pm(·) > pm(c) and θ(pm(c)− c)− kp > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. We prove the corollary in three parts.
1. kp < k̂p(0). Since k̂
′
p(µ) > 0 by Lemma 2 we have kp < k̂p(µ) for all µ ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 1 establishes that firm profits are increasing in µ, and social welfare




56Note that social welfare depends on k̃ only through its effect on the price, pm(c+ k̃).
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2. kp ∈ [k̂p(0), k̂p(1)]. Firm profits are a continuous function of kp and µ, and
Proposition 1 demonstrates that firm profits are increasing in µ. So firm prof-
its are maximized when µ = 1. Now consider social welfare. Suppose µ is
sufficiently small so that k̂p(0) ≤ k̂p(µ) < kp < k̂p(1). We are in part 2 of






> W (pm(c), c). If µ is larger
so that k̂p(0) ≤ kp < k̂p(µ) ≤ k̂p(1) then we are in part 1 of Proposition 1 and
social welfare is W (pm(c+ k̃), c+k) < W (pm(c), c). Social welfare is maximized
when µ satisfies k̂p(µ) < kp. One solution is µ = 0.
3. kp > k̂p(1). It follows that kp > k̂p(µ) for all µ ∈ [0, 1). We are in part 3 of
Proposition 1. Firms and society are indifferent about the value of µ.
















kd and kp ∈ (k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c)− c)) when µ ∈ (0, 1] and kp = k̂p(µ)
when µ = 0.
Recall that the expression Π (c+ kp/θ, c) represents the firms’ profits if they charge
p = c + kp/θ and litigation is deterred. This is a strictly increasing function of kp
for all kp ∈ [0, θ(pm(c) − c)], equals zero if kp = 0, and equals Π(pm(c), c) when
kp = θ(p






the firms’ profits when kp = 0 (but kd ≥ 0) and all lawsuits are brought (see Case 1
of Proposition 1). This is independent of kp, is strictly positive (since we’ve assumed
kp = 0 in defining z), and is strictly smaller than Π(p
m(c), c) for all kd > 0. Therefore,

































Π(pm(z + µk̂p(µ)), z + µk̂p(µ)). Given that k̂p(µ) > 0 and that Π (c+ kp/θ, c)
is strictly increasing with respect to kp, we must have kp ∈ (k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c) − c)).














Π(pm(z + µk̂p(0)), z + µk̂p(0)). Hence, kp = k̂p(0).
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We will now define the threshold kp in case 2. Note that for (k̂p(µ), kp) to be a non-
empty set, we need µ ∈ (0, 1]. Given a value kp ∈ (k̂p(µ), kp), define kp ∈ (0, k̂p(µ)),
such that











kd. The left-hand side are the firm’ profits if they charge
p = c + kp/θ and litigation is deterred. The left-hand side is positive, greater than
Π(c + k̂p(µ)/θ, c), and does not depend on kp. The right-hand side represents the
firms’ profits if litigation is allowed (see Case 1 of Proposition 1). Since y is an
increasing function of kp, the right-hand side is a decreasing function of kp. When
kp = 0 then y = z and the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side (since
kp ∈ (k̂p(µ), kp)). When kp = k̂p(µ) then the left-hand side is larger than the right-
hand side. Therefore the threshold kp ∈ (0, k̂p(µ)) exists and is unique. With kp and
kp properly defined, let’s turn to the three cases in the proposition.
First, consider Case 1, where kp < k̂p(µ). By definition, we get k
c
p < kp < k̂p(µ).
From Case 1 of Proposition 1, we know that profits are (at least weakly) higher with
kcp, while social welfare is strictly higher with k
c
p. Hence, when µ ∈ (0, 1] firms have a
strictly positive incentive to allow class actions and the social welfare is higher. When
µ = 0, the firms are indifferent with respect to class action.
Now, consider Case 2, where kp ∈ [k̂p(µ), kp). Note that, we are assuming that
µ ∈ (0, 1]. If kcp > kp, from above, firm profits are lower with class actions. So the firm
will block class actions. From Proposition 1, if kcp ≥ k̂p(µ), the firms’ blocking class
actions is socially inefficient. On the other hand, if kcp < k̂p(µ), firms’ blocking class
actions is socially efficient. When kcp ≤ kp then firm profits are (at least weakly) higher
with class actions and the firm will therefore allow class actions. From Proposition
1 and Corollary 1, we know that social welfare would be higher if class actions were
blocked.
Finally, consider Case 3, where kp ≥ kp. For any kcp < kp, firm profits are lower
with class actions (even if kcp = 0). So the firms will block class actions. This is
socially inefficient if kcp > k̂p(µ). This is because social welfare is decreasing in k
c
p
when kcp ∈ [k̂p(µ), θ(pm(c)− c)) (see Proposition 1 Case 2). Blocking class actions is
socially efficient if kcp ≤ k̂p(µ).
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 2 establishes that k̂p(µ) is increasing in µ. Since
µ(1− γ) < µ, we have k̂p(µ(1− γ)) < k̂p(µ).
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1. Suppose kp < k̂p(µ(1− γ)) < k̂p(µ). We are in part 1 of Proposition 1 whether
the firm allows or blocks class actions. Proposition 1 establishes that firm




1−θ . So, the results about the private and social desirability of class actions
in Proposition 3 follow immediately from the property that µ(1− γ) < µ.
2. Suppose kp ∈ [k̂p(µ(1− γ)), k̂p(µ)]. If the firm blocks class actions, then we are
in part 1 of Proposition 1 since kp ≤ k̂p(µ). There is litigation in equilibrium
and social welfare is W (pm(c+ k̃), c+ k) < W (pm(c), c). If the firm allows class
actions, then we are in part 2 of Proposition 1 since kp ≥ k̂p(µ(1 − γ)). The






> W (pm(c), c).
So, social welfare is higher when class actions are allowed. The result that the
firm will block actions follows from the property that firm profits are increasing
in µ and the profit function is continuous.
3. When kp > k̂p(µ) then firms and society are indifferent about allowing and
blocking class actions.
A6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329316
40
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 180 [2020]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/180
Online Appendix B
This appendix contains formal propositions and proofs of the extensions discussed in
Section 4.
Lemma 3. (Settlement Extension.) Aggregate firm profits may be written as a piece-
wise continuous function of the price, p:
Π(p, c) if p ≤ c+ kp/θ
Π(x(p), c)− (1− µ)D(x(p))s(p) if p > c+ kp/θ
(23)
where s(p) and x(p) are defined in (11) and (12), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 3. When p ≤ c + kp/θ lawsuits are not brought and so aggregate
profits are D(p)(p − c) = Π(p, c). When p > c + kp/θ cases are brought and are
settled for s(p). Firm profits are:
D(x(p))(p− c− s(p))
= D(x(p))(p− µs(p)− c− (1− µ)s(p))
= D(x(p))(p− µs(p)− c)− (1− µ)D(x(p))s(p).
Substituting x(p) = p− µs(p) from (12), profits are
D(x(p))(x(p)− c)− (1− µ)D(x(p))s(p)
= Π(x(p), c)− (1− µ)D(x(p))s(p).
Proposition 4. (Settlement Extension.) Suppose the consumers and the firms engage
in Nash settlement bargaining under symmetric information with α ∈ [0, 1] represent-
ing the firms’ bargaining power. There exists a threshold k̂sp(µ) ∈ (0, θ(pm(c) − c)]
with the following properties.
1. If kp < k̂
s












pm(c + k̃s), c + k̃s
)
and social welfare is W (pm(c + k̃s), c). As kp
increases, both firm profits and social welfare increase.
2. If kp ∈ [k̂sp(µ), θ(pm(c)− c)) and µ ∈ [0, 1), the price is c+ kp/θ and no lawsuits
are brought in equilibrium. Aggregate firm profits are Π (c+ kp/θ, c) and social
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welfare is W (c+kp/θ, c). As kp increases, firm profits increase and social welfare
decreases.
3. If kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c) and µ ∈ [0, 1], the firms charge pm(c) and no lawsuits are
brought in equilibrium. Aggregate firm profits are Π(pm(c), c) and social welfare
is W (pm(c), c). Neither firm profits nor social welfare depend on kp.
k̂sp(µ) has following properties: (1) k̂
s
p(0) ∈ (0, θ(pm(c)− c)); (2) dk̂sp(µ)/dµ > 0; and
(3) k̂sp(1) = θ(p
m(c)− c).
Proof of Proposition 4. If kp ≥ θ(pm(c)− c), then the firms can charge pm(c) without
any threat of litigation. If kp < θ(p
m(c)− c), then consumers would bring suit if the
firms charge pm(c). Suppose the price is sufficiently high (i.e., p > c+ kp/θ), so that
the consumers have a credible threat to go to trial. The firms’ aggregate profits are
D(x(p))(p− c− s(p)) where x(p) is defined in (12) above. Substituting for s(p) from
(11) above gives the firms’ aggregate profits:
D(x(p)) [(1− θ)(p− c)− kd + α(kp + kd)] .
We will now replace p− c in this profit function with a function that doesn’t depend
on p directly and is linear in x(p)− c. Substituting (11) into (12) allows us to write:
x(p) = p− µθ(p− c) + µkp − µ(1− α)(kp + kd),
which becomes:
x(p) = (p− c) + c− µθ(p− c) + µkp − µ(1− α)(kp + kd),
x(p) = (1− µθ)(p− c) + c− µ[kd − α(kp + kd)],
(1− µθ)(p− c) = x(p)− c+ µ[kd − α(kp + kd)].











[kd − α(kp + kd)]. (24)










































(kd − α(kp + kd))
]
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(kd − α(kp + kd)) . (25)








x(p), c+ k̃s(kp, µ)
)
. If p = c + kp/θ, the firms deter lawsuits
and earn profits of Π (c+ kp/θ, c).
Define k̂sp to be the implicit solution to








x− c− k̃s(kp, µ)
)}
. (26)
where k̃s(kp, µ) is defined in (25) above.
Claim 1. An implicit solution to equation (26), k̂sp ∈ (0, θ(pm(c) − c)], exists and is
unique.
Proof of Claim 1. Consider first the left-hand side of (26). When kp = 0, the
left-hand side is equal to Π(c, c) = 0, and when kp = θ(p
m(c) − c) it is equal to
Π(pm(c), c). Moreover, Π (c+ kp/θ, c) is a strictly increasing function of kp for all
kp ∈ [c, θ(pm(c) − c). Finally, regularity condition on the demand function, i.e.,
D′′(p)(p− c) + 2D′(p) < 0 ∀p, implies that Π (c+ kp/θ, c) is a concave function of kp.
Now consider the right-hand side of (26). First, note that since k̃s(kp, µ) defined in
(25) is a weakly decreasing function of kp. Therefore, using the envelope theorem, the
right-hand side of (26) is a continuous and weakly increasing function of kp. Second,
when kp = 0, the right-hand side is strictly positive (as it is for all kp). Hence, when
kp = 0, the right-hand side of (26) is strictly larger than the left-hand side.
We will now show that when kp = θ(p
m(c) − c), the right-hand side is, at least
weakly, smaller than the left-hand side. Note first that the left-hand side of (26) is
independent of µ ∀kp ∈ [0, θ(pm(c) − c)]. Second, when µ = 1, (25) implies that
k̃s(kp, 1) = 0, so the right-hand side of (26) equals maxx {D(x)(x− c)} = Π(pm(c), c)
∀kp. That is, when µ = 1, the right-hand side of (26) is equal to the left-hand side.
Third, we now show that when µ < 1, the right-hand side of (26) is smaller than
Π(pm(c), c). Differentiating the right-hand side of (26) with respect to µ, and after
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(kd − α(kp + kd))
]
.

























D(x∗) [θ(p∗ − c) + kd − α(kp + kd)] ,







Given that s(p) > 0 whenever θ(p − c) > kp, which is the case for the right-hand
side, this expression is strictly positive. Therefore, the right-hand side of (26) is a
strictly increasing function of µ. In sum, we have established existence of an implicit
solution k̂sp and that when µ = 1 that k̂
s
p = θ(p
m(c) − c) and when µ ∈ [0, 1) that
k̂sp ∈ (0, θ(pm(c)− c)).
We have already shown that the left-hand side is an increasing and a concave function
of kp. We now show the right-hand side is an increasing and a convex function of
kp. Letting x
∗(kp, µ) be the effective price that maximizes the right-hand side of (26).





∗(kp, µ)− c− k̃s(kp, µ)).



























D(x∗(kp, µ)) > 0
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Note that dD(·)/dx < 0 because demand curves slope downwards and, from (25), we
have dx∗(kp, µ)/dkp < 0. So the second derivative is positive. Therefore the right-
hand side of (26) is an increasing and convex function of kp. Combining with the
results that the right-hand side (1) is strictly positive when kp = 0; (2) is strictly
smaller than Π(pm(c), c) when kp = θ(p
m(c) − c) and µ < 1; and (3) is increasing
with respect to kp, we have established uniqueness. Finally, given that the right-hand
side is increasing with respect to µ while the left-hand side is independent of µ, as
µ increases, k̂sp increases, and as shown before, when µ = 1, k̂
s
p = θ(p
m(c) − c): the
comparative statics is also established.
Before we proceed, we need to prove one more point: in case kp < k̂
s
p, consumers
will, in fact, have a credible litigation threat in equilibrium. Unlike the case without
the possibility of settlement, this issue is not as straightforward since, when α is
sufficiently close to 1, for instance, we can have k̃s < 0 and the firms can have an
effective marginal cost that is lower than c, which, in turn, lowers x∗.
Claim 2. If kp < k̂
s
p defined in (26), and if the effective price is p






[(1 − α)kd − αkp], then consumers have a credible threat to sue and all
cases settle in equilibrium.
Proof of Claim 2. In this proof, we will do comparative statics on the parameters
kp and α and will hold all of the other parameters constant. For a slight abuse of
notation (since we’re holding µ constant), let k̂sp(α) be the implicit solution to (26),
expressed as a function of the parameter α (while holding all other parameters fixed).
Let x∗(kp, α) denote the effective price that maximizes the right-hand side of (26) and
let p∗(kp, α) be the corresponding actual price paid by consumers at the time of sale.
Using the definitions of s(p) and x(p) in (11) and (12) we have:
p =
x(p)− µθc+ µ(kd − α(kp + kd))
1− µθ
, (27)
and so we have
p∗(kp, α) =
x∗(kp, α)− µθc+ µ(kd − α(kp + kd))
1− µθ
. (28)
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We will now prove that when kp = k̂
s
p(α) and the effective price is x
∗(k̂sp(α), α) and
the actual price is p∗(k̂sp(α), α), then the consumers have a credible threat to sue:
p∗(k̂sp(α), α) ≥ c + k̂sp(α)/θ. We first prove this for α = 1, and then prove the result




Consider first the special case where α = 1. It is not difficult to show that the firms’
profit function in (13) is a continuous function of p in this special case. Note that
when α = 1 and p = c + kp/θ, then equation (11) gives s(p) = 0 and equation
(27) gives us p = x(p). So, the firms’ profits in (13) when p approaches c + kp/θ
from below or above is equal to Π(p, c). Recall that x∗(k̂sp(1), 1) is the effective
price that maximizes on the right-hand side of (26). The maximized profits on the
right-hand side of (26) equal the profits on the left-hand side, Π(c + k̂sp(1)/θ, c). So
p∗(k̂sp(1), 1) = x
∗(k̂sp(1), 1) = c + k̂
s
p(1)/θ. Therefore the plaintiff has a (weakly)
credible threat to sue.
Now suppose α < 1. We will prove that when kp = k̂
s
p(α), that the actual price
p∗(k̂sp(α), α) > c+ k̂
s
p(α)/θ so the plaintiff has a credible threat to sue. First, we will
prove that p∗(kp, α) is a decreasing function of α. Recall that x







[(kd−α(kp+kd)]. So holding kp fixed, an increase in the parameter
α will lower the value of k̃s and will decrease the firm’s effective price. Therefore the
effective price x∗(kp, α) is an decreasing function of α. Examination of equation (28)
verifies that p∗(kp, α) is a decreasing function of α, too.
57
Second, we will prove that k̂sp(α) < k̂
s
p(1) for all α < 1. To streamline the proof,
define the function Ψ(kp, α) be the maximized profits on the right-hand side of (26).
Given the definition of k̂sp(1), we have:








[kd − α(kp + kd)] is a decreasing function of α, we know that the
right-hand side of (26) is an increasing function of α. So, holding kp fixed at k̂
s
p(1),
we have Ψ(k̂sp(1), 1) > Ψ(k̂
s






[kd − α(kp + kd)] is a
decreasing function of kp, we have Ψ(k̂
s
p(1), α) > Ψ(0, α). Finally, we know that
57Consider the right-hand side of equation (28). When α rises, x∗(kp, α) falls and there is also a
negative direct effect since α appears with a negative sign in the numerator. Therefore p∗(kp, α) is
a decreasing function of α.
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Ψ(0, α) > 0 = Π(c + 0/θ, c). Putting these expressions together, for all α < 1, we
have:
Π(c+ k̂sp(1)/θ, c) > Ψ(k̂
s
p(1), α) > Ψ(0, α) > Π(c+ 0/θ, c). (30)
It follows that there is a fixed point, k̂sp(α) ∈ (0, k̂sp(1)), that satisfies Π(c+k̂sp(α)/θ, c) =
Ψ(k̂sp(α), α).
To recap, we have established above that when kp = k̂
s
p(α) and the effective price
is x∗(k̂sp(α), α) that the actual price p
∗(k̂sp(α), α) ≥ c + k̂sp(α)/θ) so consumers have




Recall that the effective price that maximizes the profit function on the right-hand
side of (26) is x∗(kp, α) = p





[kd − α(kp + kd)]. Since k̃s is
a decreasing function of kp for all µ < 1 and α > 0, we know that the effective price
x∗(kp, α) is a decreasing function of kp. To verify that the actual price p
∗(kp, α) is a
decreasing function of kp, consider the right-hand side of equation (28) above. When
kp rises, the right-hand side falls for because x
∗(kp, α) falls and because kp appears
with a negative sign. So, when kp < k̂
s
p(α), the actual price is higher: p
∗(kp, α) >
p∗(k̂sp(α), α). Since c + kp/θ < c + k̂
s
p(α)/θ, the plaintiff has a credible threat to sue
for all kp < k̂
s
p(α).
In sum, we have shown that there exists a unique k̂sp(µ) ∈ (0, θ(pm(c)− c)], such that
(1) when kp < k̂
s
p(µ), firms allow litigation in equilibrium and charge the effective price
of pm(c+ k̃s); (2) when kp ∈ [k̂sp(µ), θ(pm(c), c)), firms set the price equal to c+ kp/θ
and disallow litigation in equilibrium; and (3) when kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c), firms charge
pm(c), realize full monopoly profits, while no lawsuits are brought in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. (Fee Shifting Extension.) Suppose the loser in litigation must reim-
burse the winner’s litigation costs. With µ = 1, when θ > kd
kp+kd
, we get k̂erp (µ) >
k̂p(µ), and when θ ≤ kdkp+kd , we get k̂
er
p (µ) ≤ k̂p(µ). With µ < 1, however, k̂erp (µ) R
k̂p(µ).
Proof of Proposition 5. From the expressions of kerp = (1 − θ)(kp + kd) and kerd =
θ(kp + kd), it is clear that (1) when θ >
kd
kp+kd
, kerp < kp; (2) when θ <
kd
kp+kd
, kerp > kp;
and (3) when θ = kd
kp+kd
, kerp = kp.
Now, consider the equation (8). With the English Rule, in order to maximize the
profit while keeping the litigation off the equilibrium, the firms will now have to set
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θ(p − c) = kerp . Hence, when θ > kdkp+kd and k
er
p < kp, the left-hand side of the
equation (8) is larger. Conversely, when θ < kd
kp+kd
and kerp > kp, the left-hand side of
the equation (8) is smaller.
Similarly, with the English Rule, it is easy to show that the maximized right-hand
side of the equation (8) becomes:
Π(x∗, c+ kp + kd)− (1− µ)D(x∗)[θ(p(x∗)− c)− kerp ],
where we used the expression x∗ to denote the argument that maximizes the right-
hand side of (8). From the expression, it is clear that, when µ = 1, because the second
term disappears, the right-hand side is independent of the cost reimbursement rules.
Hence, with µ = 1, when θ > kd
kp+kd
, we get k̂erp (1) > k̂p; and when θ ≤ kdkp+kd we get
k̂erp (1) ≤ k̂p.
On the other hand, when µ < 1, when θ > kd
kp+kd
, the right hand size is smaller
compared to the case without fee-shifting. Since both sides of equation (8) decrease,
we get k̂erp R k̂p. When θ ≤ kdkp+kd , both sides of equation (8) increase, thereby making
it uncertain whether k̂erp is greater or smaller than k̂p.
Proposition 6. (Damage Multipliers Extension.) If θ < 1, then k̂p(µ) > 0; as θ
increases, k̂p(µ) increases when µ = 1 but may or may not increase when µ < 1. If
θ ≥ 1, then k̂p(µ) = 0; firms will set p = min{pm(c), c + kp/θ}, avoid litigation in
equilibrium, and realize a strictly positive profit ∀kp > 0 and ∀µ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose θ < 1 and consider the equation (8). When we
differentiate the right-hand side with respect to θ, with the envelope theorem, we get:
−(1− µ)D(x∗)
[





and using the expression for p(x) in (7) this becomes
−(1−µ)D(x∗)
[













Note that when µ = 1, the expression is equal to zero: with µ = 1, the right-hand
side does not change as θ changes. When µ < 1, on the other hand, since x∗ − c > 0
in equilibrium, the expression is strictly negative. For instance, when µ = 0, the
expression becomes −D(x∗)(p(x∗, θ) − c) < 0. Hence, when µ < 1, the right-hand
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side decreases as θ increases: allowing litigation in equilibrium becomes less attractive
as θ increases.
Now consider the left-hand side of (8). Since we know that when the firms are blocking
litigation in equilibrium, the price c+kp/θ is less than the full monopoly price, p
m(c).
Recall that the profit function Π(p, c) is concave in price p. So raising θ lowers the
price c + kp/θ, making it even further away from p
m(c) and reducing firm profits.
Therefore, the left-hand side of (8) decreases as θ increases.
Combining these two results, when µ = 1, while the right-hand side of the equation
(8) stays constant, the left-hand side decreases, thereby increasing k̂p(1). In other
words, when µ = 1, the firms become more willing to allow litigation in equilibrium.
On the other hand, when µ < 1, both the right-hand side and the left-hand side of
equation (8) decrease, thereby making it ambiguous whether k̂p(µ) will increase or
decrease.
Now suppose θ ≥ 1. If pm(c) ≤ c + kp/θ, the firms can charge pm(c) without the
threat of litigation. So the case of interest is pm(c) > c+ kp/θ. Using equation (5), if
the firms charge a price p > c+ kp/θ, the firms’ aggregate profits are
D(x(p))((1− θ)(p− c)− kd) < 0,
since θ ≥ 1 and kd > 0. When θ ≥ 1, the firms will not allow litigation in equilibrium.
Hence, the optimal strategy for the firms is to set p = c + kp/θ, avoid litigation in
equilibrium, and realize a positive profit ∀kp > 0 and ∀µ ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 7. (Public Enforcement Extension.) Suppose σF < (1−στ)Π(pm(c), c),
so that public enforcement by itself does not deter collusion. If private antitrust law-
suits are prohibited, the firms charge pm(c) and social welfare is W (pm(c), c).58 If pri-
vate antitrust lawsuits are allowed, there exists a threshold k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) ∈ [0, θ(pm(c)−
c)) with the following properties.
1. If kp < k̂
g
p(µ;σ, τ), the effective price is p






, private lawsuits are brought in equilibrium and social welfare is
W (pm(c+ k̃g), c+ k).





, the price is p ∈ {c, c + kp/θ}, no private
lawsuits are brought, and social welfare is W (p, c).
3. If kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c), the price is pm(c), no private lawsuits are brought, and
social welfare is W (pm(c), c).
58We are assuming that the fine F and the penalty τ are transfers and therefore welfare neutral.
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Proof of Proposition 7. The analysis follows the structure of the proof for Lemma 2
but with some variations. Foremost, suppose private enforcement actions are pro-
hibited. In that case, when the firms collude with p > c, their aggregate profits
are:
D(p)(p− c)− σ(τD(p)(p− c) + F )
= D(p)(1− στ)(p− c)− σF.
With the assumption of σF < (1 − στ)Π(pm(c), c)), the aggregate profits are max-
imized when the firms set p = pm(c). In equilibrium, firms realize D(pm(c))(1 −
στ)(pm(c)− c)− σF and the social welfare is W (pm(c), c).
Now, suppose private enforcement actions are allowed. As before, we need to consider
two cases. First, if the firms were to collude with p = c + kp/θ, there would only be
public enforcement against collusion. The firms’ aggregate profits will be
D(p)(1− στ)(p− c)− σF.
If the firms were to set p > c+ kp/θ, on the other hand, consumers will bring suit ex
post. The effective price paid by the consumers is given by:
x(p) = p− σµ(θ(p− c)− kp),
and the aggregate firm profits are given by:
D(x(p))(p− c− στ(p− c)− σ(θ(p− c) + kd))− σF
= D(x(p))((1− σ(τ + θ))(p− c)− σkd)− σF
= D(x(p))(x(p)− c−σk)−σ(1−µ)D(x(p))(θ(p− c)− kp)−σ(D(x(p))τ(p− c) +F ).
From the second line, we see that when σ(τ+θ) > 1, and by setting p > c+kp/θ, firms
realize a negative profit. In this case, allowing private litigation is (weakly) dominated
by deterring private litigation. This is equivalent to the result with damage multiplier
(with θ > 1).
To rewrite the aggregate profit expression in terms of x, when we were to invert





When we use this expression to rewrite the firms’ aggregate profit function (when
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p > c+ kp/θ) becomes:


















. Note that when τ = 0, σ = 1, and F = 0,









, which is identical
to the earlier case with no public enforcement. When the firms choose x to maximize
the aggregate profits, we get the equilibrium aggregate profits of:












where x∗ = pm(c+ k̃g) stands for the maximand.
With these two profit functions, to show that there is a k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) ∈ [0, θ(pm(c)− c)),
first consider the firms’ aggregate profits when they set p = c+ kp/θ:
Π(c+ kp/θ, c) = D(c+ kp/θ)(1− στ)(kp/θ)− σF.
Note first that when kp ∈ [0, θ(pm(c), c)], the profits are strictly increasing with respect
to kp. When F > 0, ∃k′p > 0, such that D(c+kp/θ)(1−στ)(kp/θ)−σF ≤ 0 ∀kp ≤ k′p.
Hence, when kp ∈ [0, k′p, firms will simply set p = c and realize Π(c, c) = 0. When
kp = θ(p
m(c)− c), on the other hand, the firms realize an expected aggregate profit of
D(pm(c))(1−στ)(pm(c)−c)−σF . With the assumption of D(pm(c))(1−στ)(pm(c)−
c)−σF = (1−στ)Π(pm(c), c) > 0, we get k′p < θ(pm(c)−c). Hence, when firms deter
private litigation (by setting p ∈ {c, c + kp/θ}), their expected aggregate profits are
equal to zero when kp ∈ [0, k′p] and are strictly increasing when kp ∈ (k′p, θ(pm(c), c)].
Now consider the firms’ aggregate profits when they allow private actions (p > c +





x∗ − c− k̃g
)
−






. Foremost, note that ∂k̃
g
∂kp




aggregate profits are, therefore, decreasing as kp rises. Given that
∂k̃g
∂τ
> 0, a larger τ
functions as an increase in marginal cost for the firms. When kp = 0, for any x, the
aggregate profits become:




x− c− µ 1− σµθ




Note that when F is sufficiently large or σ(τ + θ) ≥ 1, this expression is (weakly)
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negative ∀x ≥ 0. If, on the other hand, when F is sufficiently small and σ(τ + θ) < 1,
firms can realize a strictly positive profit when kp = 0 with p > c. Finally, given that
∂Π(x∗(kp))
∂kp
< 0, with a sufficiently high kp, which may be less than θ(p
m(c), c), we can
get Π(x∗(kp)) ≤ 0. In that case, firms will simply set p = c.
With these two aggregate profit expressions, it is clear that there exists a k′′p ∈
[0, θ(pm(c)−c)) where the two profits are equal to each other. Let k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) = inf(k′′p).
Given that k′p > 0, there are three possibilities: k̂
g
p(µ;σ, τ) = 0 (which happens when
F is sufficiently large (but with σF < (1 − στ)Π(pm(c), c)) or when σ(τ + θ) > 1);
k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) ∈ (0, k′p); and k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) ∈ [k′p, θ(pm(c), c)).
When kp < k̂
g
p(µ;σ, τ), firms allow private litigation in equilibrium. The social welfare
is W (pm(c + k̃g), c + k) < W (pm(c), c). Allowing private actions, therefore, reduce
social welfare. Furthermore, as τ increases, k̃g increases and both firm profits and
W (pm(c+ k̃g), c+k) decrease. When kp ≥ k̂gp(µ;σ, τ), they block litigation by setting
p ∈ {c, c+ kp/θ}. The social welfare is W (p, c) > W (pm(c), c). In this region, private
actions complement public enforcement and increase social welfare. Note that the
firms will set p = c when k̂gp(µ;σ, τ) ≤ k′p and kp ∈ [k̂gp(µ;σ, τ), k′p). Finally, when
kp ≥ θ(pm(c) − c), firms set p = pm(c). The social welfare is W (pm(c), c): private
actions have no effect on social welfare.
Proposition 8. (Repeat Play Extension.) Consider an infinitely repeated pricing
game where a firm that deviates from the collusive price is exempt from liability.











2. If kp ≥ k̂p(µ) then the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is sustainable if and only if
r ≤ 1
N−1 .
Proof of Proposition 8. We will construct conditions for which the outcome in Propo-
sition 1 can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of a repeated pricing game. If all N
firms charge p they divide the market equally; if firm i deviates to a different price
pi, this is observed immediately by the cartel and there is Nash reversion where firms
earn zero profits in the next round and every round thereafter.
1. Suppose kp > k̂p(µ). We are in case 2 or 3 of Proposition 1 where the firms
set p ≤ c + kp/θ and there is no equilibrium litigation. As above, the most
profitable deviation is pi = p− ε where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, and collusion
is sustainable when r ≤ 1
N−1 .
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2. Suppose kp ≤ k̂p(µ). We are in case 1 of Proposition 1 where firms set p >
c+ kp/θ and there is equilibrium litigation. The effective price is p
m(c+ k̃) and
denote aggregate cartel profits as Π̃ = 1−θ
1−µθΠ(p
m(c + k̃), c + k̃) < Π(pm(c), c).
If a firm deviated and charged an actual price pi slightly below the cartel’s
effective price, pi = p
m(c + k̃) − ε, the firm would capture the entire market,
and avoid all litigation, and have gross profits of Π(pm(c+ k̃), c). However, note
that since the deviator’s unit cost is c (they are exempt from liability), the most
profitable deviation is pi = p
m(c) < pm(c+ k̃) giving the deviating firm a gross
profit of Π(pm(c), c). The firm will not deviate when the gain from deviating,
Π(pm(c), c) − 1
N
Π̃ is smaller than the long run loss from Nash reversion, 1
rN
Π̃.







N−1 . The last step
follows from Π̃ < Π(pm(c), c).
Finally, the proof has assumed that a deviating firm is exempt from liability, but
the case when a deviating firm is subject to liability is simpler. Suppose that a firm
who deviates from the collusive agreement in Proposition 1 still faces liability for
overcharges. It is easy to see that if the firms are sufficiently patient, r ≤ 1
N−1 , the
outcome in Proposition 1 is sustainable as an equilibrium of the repeated pricing
game.59 Given that the effective price (under collusion), x = p−µ×max{(1− θ)(p−
c)−kp, 0}, is an increasing function of the actual price, the most profitable unilateral
deviation is to undercut the actual price slightly and capture the entire market.60









Π, when r ≤ 1
N−1 .
61
59In our simple model with homogeneous products and no capacity constraints, the threshold
discount rate does not depend on the price p. In other settings, higher prices could make collusion
harder for the firms. See for example Bos et al.’s (2018) elegant model of public enforcement.
60If a firm deviates to a slightly lower price pi < p, then the effective price is lower as well, xi < x.
61A similar argument demonstrates that collusion is totally deterred, and firms earn zero profits,
when r > 1N−1 .
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